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ABSTRACT 
As this study establishes, the influence of Islamist extremists has expanded into 
the United States. The terrorist organization known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS) has attracted many U.S. citizens to support its radical perspective of Islam. The 
ultimate goal of ISIS is to rule the Muslim world. Although establishing a caliphate or 
unleashing holy war on U.S. soil is clearly not in ISIS’s immediate plans, its current goal 
is to recruit as many American supporters as possible. Since ISIS’s declaration of its 
caliphate, American citizens have supported ISIS by attempting to become foreign 
fighters, soliciting jihadist material online, or plotting attacks in the United States. 
Homegrown jihadi terrorist ideology thus poses a threat, due  to its inherently violent 
Islamic extremism. This threat needs to be defeated by a comprehensive approach that 
ensures the safety and security of the United States.
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The threat of terrorism born of radicalization is a critical issue that challenges the 
world today, and homegrown Islamic terrorists who become foreign fighters pose a 
substantial threat to our national security. The conflict in Syria and Iraq has attracted 
Western extremists eager to wage battle and violence against the United States. Although 
their number is minimal compared to the number of European Islamic State of Iraq and al-
Sham (ISIS) recruits, they remain a security concern that the government must resolve. 
Some theorists argue that the domestic terrorist threat is not a significant issue and 
that it arises due only the public’s fear of a perceived, albeit exaggerated, risk that 
underscores the problem. However, others see the threat as real and agree with terrorism 
experts, such as Will McCants, Peter Bergen, and Bruce Hoffman, that radicalization, and 
recruitment of ISIS supporters in the United States are on the rise and that attacks are 
becoming concurrently more complicated to prevent due to the diversification and 
evolution of the threat.1 
This thesis looks at the increase in the number of U.S. homegrown ISIS-inspired 
terrorists from 2014 to 2017. Estimates indicate that more than 250 Americans became 
foreign fighters in that period. Furthermore, over 161 have been arrested and convicted of 
being ISIS supporters,2 and currently, there are approximately 900 active investigations of 
individuals that may be ISIS supporters in the United States.3 This thesis reviews research 
using court records and open-source information to analyze ISIS radicalization and 
recruitment in the United States. It endeavors to explain the possible patterns of who 
supports ISIS, pledges an oath to it, and why. 
                                                 
1 William F. McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the 
Islamic State (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2016); J. M. Bergen Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in 
the Name of Islam (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2011); Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, rev. (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2006). 
2 “The Cases Program on Extremism,” George Washington University, accessed May 15, 2018, 
https://extremism.gwu.edu/cases.  
3 Bergen et al., Jihadist Terrorism 16 Years after 9/11: A Threat Assessment (Washington, DC: New 
America, 2017). 
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The threat from homegrown and lone-wolf terrorism has increased since ISIS’s 
declaration of the caliphate. According to a joint study conducted from 2006 to 2016 by 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
homegrown Islamic extremism was not a threat.4 Though white supremacists have killed 
more citizens in the United States,5 the increased of homegrown Islamic terrorists who are 
also U.S. citizens supporting the ISIS terrorist organization has taken on a new urgency 
because of past conflicts, existing networks, religious obligations, and the influence of 
social media.  
This thesis reviews the specifics of U.S. citizen foreign fighters and domestic 
supporters of ISIS. It uses a research design methodology that includes historical analysis, 
social network analysis, and presents a game-theory model on the significance of funding 
needed to abate domestic terrorism.  
Additionally, this thesis examines the globalization of the ISIS ideology, which has 
resulted in radicalization and mobilization in the United States. The notion of Americans 
declaring bayah, the religiously binding oath of loyalty to ISIS,6 poses significant issues to 
national security. This study seeks to diagnose the current outbreak of homegrown Islamic 
extremists who support ISIS and to identify the underlying reasons Americans become 
jihadists. Here are questions this thesis considers when exploring why American citizens 
would support the ISIS terrorist group: What is the appeal that lures Americans to embrace 
ISIS propaganda? What seduces them to follow such a radical ideology? Is it possible to 
recognize different triggers between someone who wants to flee America and someone 
who wants to plot a violent incident on American soil? 
In this thesis, the term “homegrown terrorism” describes the terrorist activity and 
plots U.S. citizens, and legal residents have planned. The term “jihadist” describes a 
radicalized individual who believes the extreme Islamic ideology justifying a holy war 
                                                 
4 Lisa Monaco, “Preventing the Next Attack,” Foreign Affairs, December 2017, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2017-10-16/preventing-next-attack. 
5 Monaco, “Preventing the Next Attack.” 
6 Jessica Stern and J. M. Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror (New York: Ecco Press, 2016). Bayah is a 
religiously binding oath of loyalty. 
xvii 
against Muslims and non-Muslims. Finally, the term “violent Islamist extremism” refers to 
an ideology that seeks to impose a radical version of Islamic law and endorses the use of 
violence against all perceived opponents, whether Muslims or non-Muslims. 
This thesis describes homegrown terrorists who are foreign fighters, the plots and 
attacks they have planned, and the rise of this occurrence in the United States since the 
appearance of ISIS. It analyzes domestic jihadist terrorism after ISIS declared the caliphate 
in 2014, along with what additional efforts the United States government, law enforcement, 
and the Intelligence Community must consider how to minimize this specific threat of 
domestic terrorism effectively. ISIS recruiters make it simple for citizens to support ISIS 
and encourage them to travel abroad to join ISIS and fight in jihad. Moreover, ISIS 
recruiters not only possess sophisticated skills and techniques, but they also use the English 
language to lure in potential candidates into the organization. In 2015, ISIS distributed a 
publication titled Hijrah to the Islamic State, which provides detailed information 
regarding travel to an international safe haven by giving how-to tips on routes, border 
security, and passports. Also in 2015, it released another publication titled How to Survive 
in the West, which informs recruits how to contact and communicate with ISIS members 
and the information needed to avoid law enforcement detection.7  
This thesis examines the radicalization trajectories of individuals who support and 
are motivated by ISIS jihadist ideology in the United States. The data in this thesis is 
gathered mostly from various authors and researchers from the New America International 
Security program Terrorism in America After 9/11, which provides information on 
homegrown terrorist activity and Islamic extremism in the United States.8 The study 
provides an overview of homegrown terrorism from 2014 to 2017 and examines the threat 
it poses to the nation. Additional sources include the George Washington University 
Program on Extremism publications ISIS in America, Fear Thy Neighbor: Radicalization 
and Jihadist Attacks in the West, and The Travelers: American Jihadists in Syria and Iraq, 
                                                 
7 Homeland Security Committee, Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign 
Fighter Travel (Washington, DC: Homeland Security Committee, 2015), https://homeland.house.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf. 
8 Peter Bergen et al., Terrorism in American after 9/11 (Washington, DC: New America 2016), 
https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/terrorism-in-america/.  
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as well as its monthly extremism tracker. These reports provide firsthand analysis of the 
threat posed to the United States by ISIS and offer a detailed examination of Americans 
who have joined and acted on behalf of ISIS.  
This thesis supports the position that U.S. government officials need to consider 
practical approaches to combating American jihadists with policies that implement 
security-related countermeasures and take steps toward further research to increase 
deradicalization efforts. These measures should include intelligence and information 
sharing, community outreach initiatives, a national counter-messaging campaign, and 
enhanced law enforcement strategies. Terrorism will never be entirely eradicated, and 
prevention of all potential attacks is impossible regardless of available resources. Even so, 
the threat to the United States of America is real and persistent. The ability to defeat and 
prevent jihadi extremism as well as homegrown terrorism requires long-term policies that 
eliminate the physical battlefield and its fighters and, more importantly, destabilizes the 
use of violence. The United States faces a complicated situation when addressing policies 
to mitigate jihadi movements because the lessons learned over the past three decades 
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1 
I. HISTORY OF THE ISLAMIC STATE 
There is no excuse for any Muslim not to migrate to the Islamic State... 
joining [its fight] is a duty on every Muslim. We are calling on you either 
to join or carry weapons [to fight] wherever you are. Islam was never a 
religion of peace. Islam is the religion of fighting. No-one should believe 
that the war that we are waging is the war of the Islamic State. It is the war 
of all Muslims, but the Islamic State is spearheading it. It is the war of 
Muslims against infidels.  
—Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi1 
To understand the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), we need to take a look 
back at essential milestones in Islamic history and Islamist radicalism. In this chapter, I 
introduce important concepts central to understanding ISIS. Next, I provide an overview 
of the struggle within the Islam faith and how the Prophet Muhammad spread Islam 
throughout the Arabian Peninsula. Additionally, a review of contemporary history 
highlights how the self-proclaimed caliphate of ISIS, armed with its sectarian and extreme 
ideology, has advanced through a massive amount of territory in Iraq and Syria. ISIS’s 
unique variation of Islam of Salafi jihadist ideology causes controversial issues among 
Muslims and continues to affect Islam dramatically today because of its extreme ideology. 
This chapter also discusses how Muslim countries have seen an escalation in jihadist 
organizations because of civil wars, past conflicts, and foreign interventions—all of which 
affect the present-day homegrown terrorism threat in the United States. Also, I review how 
ISIS has inspired supporters through its keen recruitment techniques as well as its goal to 
rule all Muslims under strict Islamic sharia law. This chapter concludes by discussing 
national security and domestic terrorism issues, concerns, and policies. 
A. THE STRUGGLE WITHIN THE ISLAM FAITH  
Starting in about 610 CE, after proclaiming revelations from the angel Gabriel, the 
Prophet Muhammad spread Islam throughout the Arabian Peninsula; Muslims consider 
                                                 
1 Frank Gardner, “Islamic State Releases ‘Al-Baghdadi Message,’” BBC News, May 14, 2015, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32744070.  
2 
him to be the messenger who founded Islam and its perfect embodiment.2 When the 
Prophet died, Islam was expanding, and there was an extensive, active Islamic community 
in the region of Arabia. Three groups emerged from this growth: the Ansars, known as the 
“helpers” because they helped the Prophet during battles against the Meccans; the 
Muhajirs, known as the “migrants;” the earliest followers of Muhammad and the Meccans 
who had been the enemies of the Prophet Muhammed but later converted and embraced 
Islam.3  
Prophet Muhammad was central to the original Muslim community, and after his 
death, a critical issue the Muslim community had to address was who was to be his 
successor. There was not one, which caused the spread of panic across the empire and 
resulted in numerous debates among scholars and challenges to Muslim leaders. The 
naming of the Prophet’s successor for leadership purposes, and the interpretation of the 
sacred writings were the two major challenges the Muslim community (umma) faced.  
The differences between groups and the issue of succession led to the split of Islam 
into two sects, the Sunnis, and Shias. The Shias supported the leadership of the Prophet’s 
cousin Ali and his descendants. Many Shia movements made claims of legitimate authority 
during the first several decades of Islam, which resulted in three main branches of Shias, 
the Twelvers, the Ismailis, and the Zaydis.4  
Regarding authority in a more orthodox manner, the Sunnis had a more political 
concept of who should lead the caliphate and believed that the leader should be from the 
Prophet’s tribe of Quraysh.5 Ultimately, the “rightly guided caliphs” (a term only used by 
Sunni)6 became the leaders in the umma. The rightly guided caliphs consisted of four men 
who led at different times. The first elected leader was Abu Bakr (632–634), who was the 
father of Aisha, wife of the Prophet and companion to Muhammad; the second, Omar (634–
                                                 
2 Afshon Ostovar, “Islam” (class notes, NS3300 Islam, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 
2018).  
3 Daniel W. Brown, A New Introduction to Islam (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2017), 155.  
4 Ostovar, “Islam.”  
5 Brown, A New Introduction to Islam, 10.  
6 Ostovar, “Islam.”  
3 
644) who was the father of Hafsa, another wife of the Prophet, and he was responsible for 
massive expansion and military successes; the third, Uthman (644–656) of the Umayyad 
clan, was also a companion of the Prophet in Mecca and married two of the Prophet’s 
daughters, Ruqayyah and Umm; and the last, Ali (656–661), was Muhammad’s son-in-law 
and the first to convert to Islam. In contrast to the Sunni, the Shias only consider Ali to be 
the rightful successor.7 
To this day, the division between Shia and Sunni persists. In the Sunni system, after 
Ali died, the caliphate passed down from father to son and was not selected by the 
community. The loss of the Prophet Muhammad created a point of contention for 
leadership and spiritual authority in the Muslim community and religion. Many may argue 
this division manifested itself in political loyalties to the Prophet’s family and both Sunni 
and Shia theology and jurisprudence took on distinctive characteristics. 
The Quran is the holy book of Islam and the foundation of Muslim theology, beliefs, 
and history for both Sunni and Shia. All Muslims consider it the word of God, not the word 
of the Prophet Muhammad. The Quran’s central teachings are that God is one and 
that Muhammad is the last in the succession of Abrahamic messengers. Furthermore, the 
Quran is central to Islam and Islamic identity, and it provides Muslims with an 
understanding of theology, law, and culture. An additional source of authority is the Hadith, 
which are hundreds of volumes of sayings attributed to Prophet Muhammed. Muslim 
scholars have spent their lives seeking to reconcile misunderstandings and contradictions 
within these works.  
B. CONTEMPORARY RADICAL HISTORY  
Since 2014, and armed with its sectarian and extreme ideology, the self-proclaimed 
caliphate of ISIS advanced extensively throughout Iraq and Syria. ISIS declares itself to 
follow the authentic form of Islam practiced in early Muslim generations. At its height, it 
controlled 100,000 square kilometers of territory encompassing over 11 million people in 
Iraq and Syria, and it collaborated with other militant networks to add provinces in Libya, 
                                                 
7 Brown, A New Introduction to Islam, 22. 
4 
Egypt, Nigeria, and Afghanistan.8  Additionally, it has claimed ungoverned spaces in Saudi 
Arabia, Algeria, the Caucasus, and established networks with jihadists pledging their 
loyalty in Somalia, the Philippines, Turkey, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Mali, and Tunisia.9 
ISIS was formed with tens of thousands of global supporters. In comparison, it has attracted 
more followers than the supporters and fighters of the mujahedeen against the Soviet 
occupation in the 1980s or those that joined al-Qaeda’s training camps.10  
ISIS supporters come from various circumstances. Some believe they were heading 
for utopia and preferred living among true Muslims instead of being surrounded by infidels, 
or nonbelievers. Others think it is part of the grand and final battle between Muslims and 
non-Muslims and feel this is their call to duty, and others want the adventure along with 
the adrenaline of combat training and battlefield experience.11 At its peak, ISIS had 
expanded and performed its organizational and military operations with success. In 
building its empire, it has emulated the knowledge and philosophy of Chinese leader Mao 
Zedong, and ISIS’s ability to prepare for the battlefield and its ability to conduct guerrilla 
attacks and conventional military operations produced initial results beyond any 
expectation of the United States and the European Union.12 
ISIS’s primary goals was to expand its territory, increase its capabilities with 
structure and governance. The group’s focus is to motivate recruits by inspiring them in a 
tainted misconception of Islam. Intimidation tactics using barbarism have also been vital 
in the ISIS campaign. ISIS’s rapes, murders, beheadings, and enslavements have become 
legendary, as has its capture of children for purposes of sexual slavery and trafficking. This 
savage group has also buried and burned people alive.  
                                                 
8 Seth Jones et al., Rolling Back the Islamic State, RR-1912 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017), 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1912.html.   
9 Jones et al., Rolling Back the Islamic State.  
10 George Friedman and Jacob L. Shapiro, “A Short History of the Islamic State,” Geopolitics Futures, 
February 12, 2018, https://geopoliticalfutures.com/short-history-islamic-state.  
11 Friedman and Shapiro, “A Short History of the Islamic State.”  
12 Daniel Byman, “Understanding the Islamic State: A Review Essay,” MIT Press 40, no. 4 (Spring 
2016): 127–165, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/617463.  
5 
ISIS has its origins in al-Qaeda in Iraq.13 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian 
militant, initially formed and founded ISIS in 1999. In 2002, al-Zarqawi led an insurgency 
in Iraq against U.S. forces, and by 2003, after the U.S. intervention in Iraq, his group began 
to grow. His ideology was exhibited through ruthless sectarian massacres.14 In 2006, al-
Zarqawi was killed, but his teachings and extreme doctrine continued to impact the Muslim 
community. As Robin Wright notes, “whereas al-Qaeda promoted a unified Islamic front 
against the West, al-Qaeda in Iraq prioritized killing Shiites and others it considered 
apostate Muslims who deserved death.”15 Al-Zarqawi’s bond with Osama Bin Laden and 
his dedication to al-Qaeda bequeathed him a high status of credibility and prominence 
among jihadists. Following his death, Abu Ayyub al-Masri briefly became his successor. 
Abu Umar al Baghdadi was appointed emir of the new Islamic State of Iraq in October 
2006 (four months later) and became the more permanent successor to Zarqawi. Hamza 
(Masri) was appointed his war minister. Much of this had to do with Omar being an Iraqi 
and Masri an Egyptian in an organization dominated by Iraqis.16  
In 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi publicly appeared and made a declaration of a 
caliphate among the Salafi jihadist Muslims worldwide.17 However, before this appearance 
he was active in Syria in 2012–2013, issuing statements as emir of ISIS. His 2014 mosque 
appearance was scheduled to celebrate the attainment of the caliphate at long last. 
Moreover, he is the ISIS leader, caliph, and self-declared leader of all Muslims. In his July 
2014 speech, he explained the Muslim community’s obligation to revitalize the caliphate 
and establish its prominence. (The last previous legitimate caliphate was the Turkish 
secularist Kemal Ataturk, who abolished the Ottoman Empire 90 years ago.)18 Al-
Baghdadi claimed dominion over the entire Muslim world, and he created ISIS to evolve 
                                                 
13 Robin Wright, The Jihadi Threat: ISIS, Al Qaeda and Beyond (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of 
Peace, 2016), https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/The-Jihadi-Threat-ISIS-Al-Qaeda-and-Beyond.pdf.  
14 Wright, The Jihadi Threat.  
15 Wright.  
16 Barbara F. Walter, “The Extremist’s Advantage in Civil Wars,” International Security 42, no. 2 
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into an established system that operated as a structured government that institutionalizes 
systems.  
During its peak in occupation, ISIS had a functioning military, legal and court 
systems, along with social services and functioning schools.19 Additionally, ISIS created a 
publishing house that produced literature for its followers that included textbooks for 
students and, of course, propaganda.20 Ultimately, ISIS intends to govern under extreme 
Islamist jihad law to defend Sunni Muslims and create a world for them governed by its 
interpretation of true Islamic law. It has led a crusade wherein it convinces people that this 
is the apocalypse and that the Islamic prophecies are coming to fruition; doomsday is here. 
The message of ISIS is that the final battle against the infidels is taking place now, and all 
true Muslims will answer the call and wage war in honor of Allah; it is the “great battle.”21  
Initially, the declaration of the caliphate created only a slight threat to U.S. citizens. 
However, by the end of 2016, 31,000 foreign fighters from 86 countries on five continents 
had left their homeland to join ISIS either in Iraq or Syria.22 From 2006 to 2014, the group 
underwent considerable changes and identified as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).23 From 
2007 to 2011, it engaged in constant battles with Iraqi and U.S. troops,24 continued to build 
itself, and again changed its title in 2013 to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, which 
we now know as ISIS.25 It had already created a splinter group in Syria, and its intended 
goal is to advance through acts of terrorism. By 2014, Raqqa, Syria’s provincial capital, 
was under total ISIS control. ISIS considers apostates to be Muslims who have violated a 
severe principle of Islam, such as supporting the occupation, under their reliance as takfir 
                                                 
19 Wright, The Jihadi Threat.  
20 Wright.  
21 William F. McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the 
Islamic State (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2016).  
22 Wright, The Jihadi Threat.  
23 Wright.  
24 Wright.  
25 Wright.  
7 
(a Muslim who is a non-believer).26 ISIS followers adhere to strict sharia law,27 but they 
over emphasize the brutal practices of this law with mass killings, stoning, and amputations 
of Sunni Muslims as well nonbelievers.28 
Many experts have studied and analyzed ISIS’s considerable and rapid growth. In 
one project, 20 specialists from various universities and organizations across the country 
researched ISIS in detail. The resulting report, titled The Jihadi Threat: ISIS, Al Qaeda and 
Beyond, concluded ISIS growth in 2013 was  
facilitated by six factors: new internal leadership; a series of prison breaks 
that grew its ranks and put hardened jihadis back on the battlefield; a 
campaign of assassinations and intimidation to degrade Iraqi Security 
Forces; chaos created by the uprising in neighboring Syria; multiple 
political failures by the Iraqi government; and the U.S. withdrawal from 
Iraq.29  
C. WAHHABI AND SALAFI JIHADIST IDEOLOGY  
ISIS’s beliefs are derived from the tenets of an ultraconservative branch of Islam 
known as Wahhabism, which originated on the Arabian peninsula in the 1700s. 
Wahhabism has profoundly impacted Islam and divided Muslims for over two centuries. 
During the eighteenth century, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (Sheikh Muhammed) and 
his followers believed their religious obligation was to spread the call (da’wa) to restore 
pure monotheistic worship and revive the authentic and original beliefs and practices of 
Islam.30 To relate this to modern times, ISIS is the first group in centuries that has insisted 
on emulating that same eighteenth-century Arabian Wahhabism by reconstituting this 
radical practice of Islam with an extreme version of sharia law.31 
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In 1744 in al-Dir’iyya, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab settled under the clan 
known as al Saud and formed the Wahhabi mission.32 The al Saud expanded their influence 
with the “infidel” Ottomans and neighboring Muslim tribes through war and conquest. To 
implement Wahhabi belief structure from his interpretation of the Hadith collections, 
Sheikh Muhammad composed The Book of God’s Unity, which represents the core of 
Wahhabism and interprets the legacy of thirteenth-century Islamic scholar Taqi al-Din Ibn 
Taymiyyah and the Hanbali school of jurisprudence. The ideological root of this form of 
Islam is radical because it rejects intellectual perceptions as maqasid (the spirit of sharia 
law), kalam (Islamic philosophy), Sufism (Islamic spirituality), ilal (the study of religious 
intentions in the Quran and hadith), and al-majaz (metaphors).33 In 1930, Saudi Arabia 
established Wahhabism as the state religion, and Wahhabis view the Saudi kingdom as the 
legitimate Islamic government.  
Sheikh Muhammad dedicated himself to the study of Islamic law and the purest 
forms of Islam practice. However, the deep divide between Sunni and Shia, along with the 
Wahhabis proclaiming other Muslims as “idolaters,” has instituted an intense hostility 
among the umma, which has lasted for centuries.34 Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab 
believed that battle is necessary when the unbeliever understands the call and rejects it. 
Moreover, he declared those who called upon Jesus, the angels, or saints despite daily 
prayers or a modest lifestyle, as unbelievers because they worshiped others before God.35 
Wahhabi beliefs include the use of punishments, such as enslavement, beheading, and 
crucifixion, and execution. 
Salafis are referred to as believers that adhere to the customs of original Muslim 
ancestors (salaf) or as a muwahhid, that is, one who professes God’s unity.36 Although 
Salafists claim a puritanical foundation, jihad and apostasy are core elements. In modern 
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times, individuals such as Osama bin Laden and the Mufti of Saudi Arabia were considered 
leaders of their Salafi communities.37 Osama bin Laden’s teaching of Salafism was 
monotheistic and strict in the belief that all Muslims must follow the same path as the 
Prophet or be considered an apostate or idolater.38 Because of the judgment that jihadi 
Salafis declare on other Muslims, this sect in Islam is continuously criticized for its brutal 
treatment of fellow Muslims. Salafis argue that other Muslims practice of devotion is 
hindered because self-fulfillment is a threat to tawhid (the oneness of God)39 and that 
following the Prophet’s guidance is absolute (the salaf)40 to ensure that humanity is saved 
from impulsiveness and lack of discipline. Their narrow interpretation opposes all forms 
of Sufi and Shia Islam, and it rejects all theological knowledge not discussed in the Quran. 
In the Salafist structure, pluralism is utterly rejected.  
Some Salafis hold different interpretations of contemporary political issues, but 
they subscribe to the same religious jurisprudence on matters, including the belief that 
retaliation is acceptable against one who attacks the umma.41 However, there are three 
distinct and separate Salafi groups in the contemporary world: the purists who focus on 
nonviolence, purification, and education; the politicos follow the Salafi creed (aqida) to 
influence social justice; and the jihadists for whom violence and revolt are resolutions.42 
Most Salafis are not jihadists, who constitute only a small minority of Salafis. However, 
this minority claims to act as the pious vanguard to awaken all Muslims to the truth, and 
this has set them far apart about their ability to influence today’s Muslim world.43 For 
example, ISIS presents the core ideology of Salafi jihadism in its return to a “pure” state 
of Islam via the institutionalization of the caliphate, the declaration of jihad, and their 
ideological stance on takfir (excommunication after one Muslim declares another an infidel 
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or apostate).44 ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is a self-declared Salafi jihadist that has 
proven he will wage war for his belief and he is justified.45 Framing its followers’ plight 
as entangled in conflict against the rationalists, ISIS has dramatically affected the world of 
Islam because of its violence toward other Muslims. In the twenty-first century, this 
extreme ideology is causing many unique political and religious challenges and leading to 
disparity, division, and debate in the Muslim community.  
D. POST-SEPTEMBER 11  
The U.S. awareness of radical Islamist extremism and the threat it implies 
dramatically increased in the aftermath of September 11, 2001.46 The presidential 
administrations of both George W. Bush and Barack Obama developed strategies to reduce 
this threat. Today, these strategies are part of what has become known as the “the global 
war on terror,”47 although the term is no longer used. Regardless, the U.S. government’s 
efforts have been proficient in neutralizing, defeating, and degrading multiple terrorist 
organizations worldwide. However, despite the operational success the United States has 
achieved, the war on terrorism is far from the government’s being able to declare victory.48 
The American-led coalition started actively bombing in September 2014 in Syria, Iraq, and 
assisting Iraq as part of a global campaign to defeat ISIS.49 Concurrently, joint forces of 
the Syrian and Iranian forces, assisted by Russian air power, battled ISIS in western Syria.50  
In spite of these victories, the 2015 Paris attacks that killed 130 individuals, and the 
San Bernardino California attack in that same year, raised concerns about ISIS globally.51 
By the beginning of 2016, the fear of terrorist attacks by ISIS in the United States and the 
                                                 
44 Hassan, The Sectarianism of the Islamic State.  
45 Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants.”  
46 Lederman, “Insider Threats.”  
47 Monaco, “Preventing the Next Attack.”  
48 Peter Feaver and Hal Brands, “Trump and Terrorism: U.S. Strategy after ISIS,” Foreign Affairs, 
March–April 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-02-13/trump-and-terrorism.  
49 Friedman and Shapiro, “A Short History of the Islamic State.”  
50 Friedman and Shapiro.  
51 Byman, “Understanding the Islamic State.”  
11 
European Union was at its highest since 9/11. Even so, by the end of 2017, despite the 
continued small-arms engagements, the U.S.-led coalition had nearly eliminated ISIS’s 
territorial control; however, its ideology and recruitment persist.52  
E. ISIS’S DISTINCTIVE VARIATION OF ISLAM  
ISIS’s ideology has been instrumental in creating a governing state and an effective 
strategy in military operations, which gives it both legitimacy and success in recruitment. 
Additionally, it has expanded its core through the monopolization of brutality and 
viciousness. ISIS believes its variation of Islam is the path to the “Day of Judgment.”53 
This perception allows ISIS to be unmerciful. If one is considered a kuffar, or infidel, and 
in the Muslim holy land, true followers must kill him or her.54 In his article “What ISIS 
Really Wants,” Graeme Wood explains,  
before the rise of the Islamic State, no group in the past few centuries had 
attempted more-radical fidelity to the prophetic model than the Wahhabis 
of 18th century Arabia, which conquered most of what is now Saudi Arabia 
where strict practices survive in a diluted version of Sharia law.55  
Followers of ISIS utilize the Quran or Hadith to justify their actions and say this 
makes them acceptable because these accord with its interpretation of sharia law. Islamic 
scripture is encompassed within the Quran and the Hadith, and ISIS leaders know these 
scriptures fluently. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, ISIS’s caliph, holds a doctorate in Quran 
studies, and his top scholars are also well educated.56 They stand proudly with their black 
flags that state, “There is only one God, Allah, and the Prophet Muhammad is his 
Messenger.”  
With its choreographed videos and imagies, ISIS intentionally provokes the anger 
of both Muslims and non-Muslims. However, at the same time, it has successfully built a 
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state, recruited followers, and captured and held territory.57 ISIS follows a takfir doctrine; 
takfir alters the status of people (from Muslims to non-Muslims), which allows specific 
punishments to be administered that would not usually be under sharia. This includes Shia 
Muslims (over approximately 200 million people are Shia), whom ISIS labels as heretics 
(ones who add false beliefs to the central faith) and other Muslims as apostates, meaning 
those who left their religion or betrayed their religion because of their different practices. 
According to ISIS beliefs, non-Muslims are kuffars, also known as infidels or 
nonbelievers.58  
F. PAST CONFLICTS—FOREIGN INTERVENTIONS  
The rise of the jihadist organization in the last two decades has contributed to civil 
war’s in Muslim countries. This environment has led to failed states, such as Iraq and Syria, 
whose vulnerabilities allow nonstate actors, such as jihadi groups, to operate and flourish 
within their borders.59 Ungoverned territories tend to breed instability and violence.  
Foreign intervention has also contributed to the rise of jihadi groups. In 1979, the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan spurred the Muslim community members to defend their 
land and liberate themselves from a foreign power. The mobilization of the support from 
United States, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia to the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviets 
further enabled jihadism.60 Embracing and seeking to further jihadism against invaders of 
Muslim lands, Osama bin Laden supported the Afghan mujahideen with funds, arms, and 
recruits. The 1990–1991 Gulf War,61 initiated by Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, 
further fostered bin Laden’s extremism. The United States and its allies sent troops to the 
region to drive Hussein out of Kuwait. The troops occupied the Gulf in response to 
Hussein’s invasion. The crux of the issue was the intervention by a half million U.S. and 
allied soldiers occupying the Persian Gulf; it was an outrage, an effrontery, to jihadists like 
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bin Laden that infidels were once again occupying Muslim lands. Furthermore, the 
American intervention in Iraq in 2003 ended the rule of Saddam Hussein and shifted the 
balance of power from a Sunni to Shia majority in Iraq, which led to a Shia-led government. 
However, an uprising of disgruntled and divided Sunni followed, launching an insurgency 
of Sunni extremism.  
The subsequent departure of American forces in Iraq in 2011, combined with the 
pressures emanating from the sectarian divide across the Middle East, has fueled civil 
unrest and war. The Islamic State caliphate was established in this environment, growing 
from its previously declared proto-state with its own emir of the faithful. Its growth was 
enabled by the events of the Arab Spring, wherein nearby Syria protestors fought against 
the apprehension and torture of a crowd of teenagers who wrote revolutionary slogans on 
school property against the al-Assad regime. Bashar al-Assad security forces used lethal 
force against the protestors, which resulted in hundreds of thousands participating in a 
nationwide demonstration to expel Assad and the Syrian regime. By 2012, Syria was in a 
full-blown civil war; opposition forces formed the Free Syrian Army to fight against the 
Syrian Army. This conflict generated thousands of supporters for the cause, and many came 
from other countries who supported the removal of Assad. As a result, ISIS gained 
influence, and it also furthered the conflict of nationalist sectarianism.62 As Mohammed 
Hafez explains,  
The defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan at the hands of Islamic 
insurgents during the 1980s was another milestone that motivated radical 
Muslims like Usama bin Ladin to take up arms against their own 
governments and to declare holy war (jihad) against Western powers. The 
goal of these radicals is to establish a new government based on Islamic law 
(shari’a) and unify the Islamic nation (umma) under a single Muslim ruler 
(khalifa or caliph). Radical Islam arose in the context of failed economic 
modernization by secular nationalist elites, political exclusion by 
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authoritarian regimes, and a cultural shift toward religious revivalism or 
fundamentalism.63 
ISIS emphasizes the promises of a just Islamic state to those living under repressive 
regimes and a society where there is no corruption and where all true Muslim are honored. 
According to ISIS propaganda, its rhetoric promises that ISIS will protect the umma and 
the justice of Allah. ISIS campaign to recruit militants led to a new branding that it 
promotes to a broader audience. ISIS promoted its territory as a safe haven for families, 
where fighters would receive salaries of $1,000 and their families would be provided 
homes and food and where children would receive religious teachings.64  
The message of ISIS stresses unity and an alternative nationalism with the goal of 
a new Islamist community. It intentionally emphasizes sectarian danger and the threat the 
U.S. and other foreign governments to Islam and Sunni Muslims.65 The core of ISIS 
strategic doctrine is the superiority of Sunni Islam over all, especially close rivals (Shia) 
who contest Sunni power and identity. It seeks to unify Sunni Islam by picking on the 
powerful “other.” Sectarianism is a means to a larger end, and only one means. It just 
happens to set ISIS apart from its former leaders (al Qaeda command). Zarqawi 
demonstrated this by attacking Shias as a tactic to destabilize the Iraqi government, the 
population, and to undermine support for the U.S military presence. His tactics did not 
work, and U.S. forces killed him in 2006.  
G. ISLAMIC RADICALIZATION  
Jihadism is monolithic with only a small subgroup of supporters. This minority 
group rejects the secularist concept of the state and resorts to violence and justifies it by 
Islamic principles and beliefs. Jihadists all believe they must fight to restore the caliphate. 
Peter Bergen defines the term “jihadist” as “radicalized individuals using Islam as an 
ideological and religious justification for their belief in the establishment of a global 
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caliphate, or jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a 
caliph.”66 For example, jihad believers have no issue with their use of brutality and murder 
because they utilize the Quran, Hadith, and sharia law.67 The message of a holy war among 
jihadists is alive and real. ISIS has strengthened its core since the declaration of the 
caliphate and believes that anything or anyone stepping in its path should be destroyed. 
With al-Baghdadi at the head of the helm, there are and will be no negotiations.  
However, believers do not generally start out as radical jihadists. Often, the 
radicalization process of an individual to a jihadist develops when an individual 
decides that the only means necessary for their cause is to conduct violence. 
Embracing radicalization is a complex evolution, and the process involves a multitude of 
viewpoints and the justification of the use of force as a means of resolving issues or 
promoting transformation. In an effort to understand and identify variables that can impact 
a person’s mindset and move him or her toward violence, Hafez argues that, 
“Radicalization usually involves grievances, ideological socialization, social networking, 
and enabling support structures.”68 This combination causes the individual to feel 
discriminated against or dehumanized. The individual breaks previous allegiances or trusts 
and then adopts a defensive stance that validates that there is a war on Islam and a call and 
duty to fight in honor.  
The organizational roots of Islam radicalization carried violence with it. Three 
pronounced ideologies originally date back to the 1900s. The first was in 1928 when 
Hassan al-Banna founded the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The second began in 1941 
when Abul Ala Mawdudi founded the Southern Asian Jama’ati Islami movement in British 
India. The third started in 1966 with Sayyid Qutb, an intellectual in the Muslim 
Brotherhood.69 Each of these three men created an Islamic activist organization with the 
purpose of establishing a government based on the core principles of Islamic law. However, 
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many consider Qutb, a prolific educator, and writer, to be the ideological founder of Sunni 
Arab jihadism. Interestingly, he resided in Colorado from 1948 to 1951, and his  
time in America seems to have begun the process of his radicalization; he 
complained about rampant racism against Arabs and Muslims in the United 
States, the moral degradation of American society, and U.S. support for the 
Jewish theft of Palestine.70  
Qutb’s radicalization materialized with his book, Milestones, which articulates core 
doctrinal conceptualizations and ideologies that have formed Sunni jihadism.71 Qutb’s 
writings have profoundly shaped and influence jihadists today.  
Hafez identifies seven vital principles that justify the use of violence and 
terrorism:72  
• Widespread ignorance (jahiliyyah), 
• Belief in God’s sovereignty (hakimiyyat), 
• Rejection of democracy because it violates God’s sovereignty, 
• Comprehensiveness and universalism of religion, 
• The necessity of takfir—declaring a Muslim to be outside of the creed, 
• Conspiracy against the Muslim world, and 
• Holy war (jihad)—the path to God as an Islamic obligation. 
The understanding and beliefs of Muslims who have radicalized are complex. 
Hafez states the four forms of Islamist radicalism are revolutionary Islamism, Islamic 
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nationalism, transnational Islamic terrorism, and Islamic sectarianism.73 According to 
Hafez below are the following meanings:74  
• “Revolutionary Islamism seeks to transform the existing political order of 
any given state or national government. Revolutionary Islamists target their 
own governments and societies to overthrow the system and establish 
Islamic law in its place.”75 
• “Islamic nationalism seeks to harness the power of Islam to fight foreign 
occupiers and demand regional autonomy.”76  
• “Transnational Islamic terrorism aims to mobilize disparate Islamic groups 
and individuals to attack Western “enemies.” While the first two forms of 
radicalism focus their violence on the “near enemy,” transnational Islamic 
terrorism emphasizes attacking the “far enemy.” Usama bin Ladin, the 
supreme leader of al-Qaida, is the pioneer of global jihad.”77  
• “Islamic sectarianism, such as ISIS, represents a mixture of revolutionary 
Islamism, sectarian Islamism, and transnational terrorism. However, its 
most dominant feature is sectarianism.”78  
A crucial component in defeating these extremist groups is understanding them; 
however, the ideology of ISIS and other radical groups is complicated and problematic. 
The use of one specific strategy to reclaim seized territory or the deactivation of a critical 
leader will not wholly neutralize the existence of the group or stop its radicalization. One 
should note that neither radicalization nor holding extremist or jihadist beliefs is illegal in 
the United States. What is illegal is the creation of homegrown terrorists who pursue their 
radical beliefs manifesting them—or attempting to demonstrate them—into violent action.  
H. PRESENT-DAY THREAT OF HOMEGROWN TERRORISM  
A homegrown jihadist terrorist is a concern of the highest priority for the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Intelligence Community, and our global, state, and local 
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partners.79 As of May 2018, 161 citizens have been charged with ISIS-related crimes; in 
which 108 have been found guilty.80 Many of these individuals are lone wolves who sow 
fear through the operational transnational network to aggravate security issues and create 
constant anxieties about future attacks.81 The ISIS ideology is a threat to every single 
American. Moreover, ISIS encourages violence on its behalf all over the world through 
social media; thus, its followers will continue to infiltrate this country and heed to the call 
of jihad, and a beaten ISIS grows more dependent on lone wolves. This terrorist 
organization has mastered the art of creating and inspiring these individuals; many of the 
masterminds behind these ISIS-inspired terrorist plots are Americans who support the 
group yet have no direct connection to it or any foreign members of the terrorist 
organization.  
The upward trend of homegrown terrorism in the United States is troublesome. 
Arrests for ISIS-related attacks in the United States have been increasing. For comparison, 
there were 42 arrests of homegrown jihadist-inspired terrorist U.S. citizens from May 2009 
through December 2012; however, from December 2015 to May 2018, there have been 
161 arrests of homegrown terrorists who have supported ISIS.82 The increase is due in large 
part to the power and role of the Internet along with existing networks of friends and family 
that enable recruitment.83 There is also evidence that anti-Muslim rhetoric has contributed 
to this rise; at a minimum, it appears to have increased pro-ISIS sentiment in the U.S, which 
suggests that an important policy would be to tone the rhetoric down.84 Unfortunately, anti-
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Muslim rhetoric appears to attract votes, so many of our current politicians are unwilling 
to embrace such a strategy. 
U.S. citizens and residents who can be motivated and inspired by ISIS propaganda 
and influenced to take violent action are a threat to the nation. Lone actors or groups of 
homegrown extremists can plan and coordinate an attack without warning. The danger of 
this brand of terrorism is real, as illustrated by the attacks in Paris, France, in San 
Bernardino, California, and the Orlando, Florida, massacre.85 The United States and its 
citizens remain to be the most targeted by ISIS-inspired attackers.86 Americans inspired by 
this jihadist ideology see the caliphate as historical and the end of time is approaching, and 
they believe that jihad is a call of duty. Some want the adventure and the military training 
and experience of war. Others join because they have a mental issue or are struggling 
through a life crisis, and they are looking for a purpose to belong to something.87  
However, American Muslims, as compared to European Muslims, tend to have 
higher education levels, prominent careers, and are better integrated into society.88 
According to the Pew Research Center, a report titled, The 2011 Muslim American Survey 
interviewed 1,033 American Muslims in which concluded out of this survey size that, 
“among American Muslims, 20% are converts to Islam, saying they have not always been 
Muslim.”89 ISIS and individuals who support this group are jihadists whose objective is to 
establish a transnational caliphate using military force; this is not a tenet in the practice of 
Islam that the majority of Muslims worldwide support. 
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1. The Internet  
ISIS’s keen ability to recruit and inspire radicalization lies within the group’s 
pioneering use of the Internet. The influence of ISIS has flourished on social media and 
motivated violence in honor of a misconception of Islam ideology. As previously stated 
ISIS’s online propaganda campaign encourages attacks on all nonbelievers. As one 
example, the online magazine of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, called Inspire, written 
in English, urges followers to wage attacks in the United States and against all 
unbelievers.90 Additionally, it encourages its supporters to execute small attacks and 
provides comprehensive and specific “how to” manuals and instructions on how to build 
and deploy a bomb, to how to orchestrate an attack.91 ISIS has repeatedly promoted lone 
wolf attacks in Western countries explicitly targetting soldiers, law enforcement, and 
intelligence members.92 ISIS’s media spokesperson in 2014, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, 
urged followers to be resourceful when confronted with the opportunity to murder an 
unbeliever. He instructs, “Kill him in any manner or way however it may be: smash his 
head with a rock, or slaughter him with a knife, or run him over with your car.”93  
Through the Internet, ISIS leverages online supporters and spreads propaganda 
resulting in terrorist activity. Moreover, it utilizes the Internet as a marketing tool to release 
speeches advocating violent and distributes high-quality media almost Hollywood-like that 
captures an alluring appeal to the organization. For instance, ISIS has released numerous 
videos glorifying horrific acts of murder, often by beheading, and brutality against its 
hostages. In 2004, ISIS abducted American Nicholas Berg, and Musab al-Zarqawi publicly  
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beheaded him. ISIS recorded and posted the graphic scene online. The video went viral 
and has been viewed tens of millions of times. Most Americans still remember that video 
and the shock they felt seeing it. As a result of the progression of technology since then, an 
online “black hole” has emerged that allows for infinite online recruitment possibilities for 
violent extremist groups to utilize. By 2015, ISIS was producing nearly 1,000 events a 
month on dozens of online platforms.94 “More than half of these products depicted utopian 
images of life in the ‘caliphate,’ stressing economic activity, law and order, and the ability 
to worship according to the ‘correct method’ without interference.”95  
As Pierson Vern discusses in his 2017 thesis, “those who join the group are either 
‘murderously devout’ or ‘devoutly murderous,’ individuals inspired by ISIS and its 
propaganda join or act because they agree with the organization’s destructive practices.”96 
ISIS’s narrative continues to remain that this is the “end times,” and an important call for 
all Muslims to defend Islam. Additionally, ISIS’s media campaign crafts a legendary tale 
of an Islam utopia by displaying imagines of ISIS members helping the elderly and giving 
health care to the sick; it portrays itself as a highly reliable organization that is meaningful 
and adventurous.97 
ISIS uses the Internet and social media sites to connect and distribute to a global 
audience. This technology has become an incubator for ISIS influence and recruitment 
because of the multitude of networks its propaganda reaches. To understand the scope of 
the online presence extremist groups like ISIS have, consider that in 2003 there were 2,600 
known websites through which these groups operated, whereas, in 2013, there are  
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approximately 10,000 known sites.98 Furthermore, extremists also use various platforms, 
such as Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, Twitter, blogs, various apps, and mobile devices, 
all of which instantly disburse their information worldwide. The various social media 
platforms available also allow ISIS and its supports to operate on the “darknet,” where the 
users enable encryption software and secure messaging applications. Making it challenging 
and complex to detect and disrupt attacks, which impacts counterterrorism efforts.  
Terrorist propaganda will continue, and homegrown terrorists, driven by a variety 
of grievances, will be motivated and inspired. As Daniel Coats argues,  
Homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) will remain the most prevalent and 
difficult-to-detect Sunni terrorist threat at home, despite a drop in the 
number of attacks in 2017. HVE attacks are likely to continue to occur with 
little or no warning because the perpetrators often strike soft targets and use 
simple tactics that do not require advanced skills or outside training.99  
The threat remains constant in the United States and to ensure that Americans feel 
safe, it is vital that U.S. government agencies promote national resilience to Islamic 
extremism. Former FBI Director James Comey stated, “ISIS blends traditional media 
platforms, glossy photos, in-depth articles, and social media campaigns that can go viral in 
a matter of seconds.”100 He also noted,  
With the widespread horizontal distribution of social media, terrorists can 
identify vulnerable individuals of all ages in the United States—spot, assess, 
recruit, and radicalize—either to travel or to conduct a homeland attack. The 
foreign terrorist now has direct access to the United States like never 
before.101  
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Social media networks have become the incubator to cultivate online holy war propaganda 
from ISIS. 
2. Recruitment 
ISIS hopes to build a global Islamic society that lives under strict Islamic sharia 
law. Recruitment is a crucial part of ISIS’s strategy to do this. Alluring social media 
publications are used to target individuals who gravitate to it have become useful 
recruitment tools. ISIS inspires foreign fighters to flee their homeland and live in an Islamic 
society, where they are rewarded and taken care, or it motivates individuals to become 
lone-wolf attackers and either to support the organization or plan to plot their attack. To 
some, there seems to be an alluring appeal and an irresistible attraction of ISIS.  
To make the masses fearful, ISIS synchronizes its operations to capture images of 
its venomous maneuvers and then distributes them online to thousands of potential recruits. 
This has led ISIS to achieve substantial enlistment numbers. Despite the loss of hundreds 
of members during its engagements, it gains hundreds more by attracting supporters from 
across the globe to its cause.102 The successful recruitment campaigns of ISIS have lured 
hundreds of thousand supporters and thus threaten both the United States and its allies.   
ISIS uses specific techniques to reach a broad range of individuals for recruitment. 
For example, some insight into ISIS recruitment tactics comes through people such as 
former American jihadist recruiter, Jess Morton, who ran the website Revolution Muslim. 
While active, he was the most productive American recruiter for Al Qaeda. Morton is a 
U.S. citizen from New York, but he no longer follows the radical Islamic ideology he 
sought once to inspire in others. In 2015, he was released from prison, and then he worked 
as an FBI informant and became a fellow at George Washington University’s Program on 
Extremism researching Islamic extremists.103 Morton explains that during the peak of his 
recruitment success, he would implant a theoretical concept of Islam in his potential recruit, 
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either during conversations in private messages or through his social media postings. In a 
2016 interview featured in the New York Times, Morton explained,  
The first concept is that God is the sole lawgiver. Then you use that principle 
to say that all the Muslim rulers, because they do not implement Sharia law 
in its entirety, they are not Muslim at all, and so we can rebel against 
them.104  
ISIS recruitment has been effective. An estimated 1,400 Americans—travelers or 
supporters—have mobilized in aid of jihad.105 Given the past 40 years of jihadist conflicts, 
the support ISIS receives in Syria and Iraq from U.S. homegrown terrorists has been the 
most unprecedented that the West has encountered to date. As Sean Reynolds and 
Mohammed Hafez note, “In total about 30,000 both men and women from at least 
86 countries have traveled to these conflicts, making the contingent of Western combatants 
among the largest at nearly 17%.”106 Moreover, law enforcement officials estimate that 
250 Americans have tried to join ISIS since 2014107 with dozens of U.S. citizens traveling 
to Syria and Iraq.108 Researchers have studied the complexities of radicalization and 
recruitment of American citizens who have left their American lives behind and traveled 
to distant lands in the name of jihad. For example, in his book Jihad Joe, John Berger 
states, “to defend Muslims in peril, some fight to establish the reign of Allah on earth. 
Some are channeling a personal rage, and others seek a community they can belong to.”109  
Social media is an innovation that has mostly benefited terrorists. As Gordon 
McCormick and Frank Giordano assert, “The Internet has made symbolic violence a more 
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powerful instrument of insurgent mobilization than at any time in the past.”110 Homegrown 
terrorists who support Islamic extremism are sometimes called lone wolves even though 
they are never truly alone due to their deliberate, persistent search for online communities. 
According to Lisa Monaco, “ISIS has created a sophisticated media machine that pumps 
out professionally produced videos, multilingual tweets, a glossy magazine, and Instagram 
posts, all serving up an intoxicating narrative that followers can belong to a cause greater 
than themselves.”111 The U.S. government has experienced many challenges with the 
social media system.  
In June 2017, a group of technology companies created the Global Internet 
Forum to Counter Terrorism, a consortium devoted to making their 
platforms less hospitable to extremists. Facebook, which boasts more 
than two billion active monthly users, is employing artificial intelligence 
and image-matching technology to stop known terrorist content from 
proliferating. Twitter, for its part, has suspended more than 375,000 
accounts promoting terrorism.112  
Increased countering violent extremism (CVE) funding and resources from the 
U.S. government would boost efforts to degrade homegrown terrorist resources. YouTube 
has implemented restrictions on Islamic jihadists, such as Anwar al-Awlaki, by blocking 
his contents and those of others who spread this form of Islamic ideology to decrease the 
potential of recruitment and radicalization among ISIS followers. Tech companies such as 
Google, Twitter, and Facebook are taking removing this material seriously and have 
implemented procedures to block and remove terrorist content from their platforms.113 
Despite the tech companies efforts, it is a continuous battle to prevent terrorist material that 
recruits and provokes violence that promotes extremism and radicalization.114 
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3. National Security and Domestic Terrorism  
The FBI’s priority is to ensure the United States and its citizens are always 
protected.115 Some of the FBI’s focus is to ensure the deactivation of terrorist cells, to deter 
terrorist sympathizers, and to dismantle potential terrorist financing or support individuals 
offer to terrorist organizations. Since 9/11, the number of U.S. persons presenting security 
concerns on the “No Fly” list and the number of FBI task force teams have both increased 
considerably. In 2001, the list had 16 individuals, and the FBI operated 35 joint terrorism 
fusion centers; however, 15 years later, there are over 81,000 individuals on the No Fly 
list, and the FBI now operates over 100 counter-terrorism centers in the United States.116 
The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) is another organization that protects 
the security interests of the United States. NCTC tracks potential foreign fighters who have 
traveled, or are suspected of planning travel, to Syria or Iraq to support ISIS. NCTC and 
the Intelligence Community collaborate their efforts to monitor known travelers in a 
U.S. government repository known as Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment. The 
repository identifies, tracks, and shares information with law enforcement and watch-list 
communities to assess and confirm the identity of known or suspected terrorists so they 
can be monitored.117 NCTC continues to expand its CVE efforts and collaborates with 
DHS, local law enforcement, and community leaders to identify markers of possible 
recruitment as well as to develop prevention action approaches and frameworks to confront 
the threat of homegrown Islamic extremists.  
The 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment indicates the continued usage of Internet 
recruitment by terrorist groups will continue to garner more followers who could 
potentially synchronize their operations. The assessment also suggests that transnational 
terrorists have cyber capabilities that can result in extortion and theft of U.S. networks and 
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expose personally identifiable information of U.S. citizens as well as increase cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities in the United States.118 This creates an impact on the Intelligence 
Community because of the breach of information this presents to national security 
information, proprietary data and files to companies and research institutions. Specifically, 
the Worldwide Threat Assessment believes transnational terrorists will target companies in 
defense, energy, finance, and technology.119 The improvement of nonstate actors’ 
intelligence capabilities enables them to conduct a plethora of illicit activities and avoid 
detection. This activity poses a threat to the United States in the cyber arena.120  
I. THREAT OF ISIS SUPPORTERS ON U.S. SOIL AND U.S. GOVERNMENT 
RESPONSES  
The attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, were a landmark event in 
the modern history of terrorism. Those events signaled both that terrorism is operationally 
sophisticated and that it has tremendous power to influence society at large and worldwide. 
Individuals who have decided to travel abroad to join a terrorist organization abroad is a 
growing threat to the United States. This study concentrates on the phenomenon of 
American citizens who have conducted or plotted attacks within the United States. The 
New American report claims that the motivations of such terrorists are complicated. 
The motivations of jihadists in the United States are difficult to disentangle. 
After reviewing hundreds of cases in this database, thousands of pages of 
court documents, and interviews and correspondence with extremists and 
their family members, it is far from clear there will ever be a straightforward 
answer.121  
Jihadists put their faith in Salafi Islam’s radicalized beliefs, and they have 
determined that it is their religious obligation to wage violence against all non-Muslims 
and Muslims who do not follow sharia law. The ISIS interpretation of Islam and the  
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organization’s quest to dominate are part of a prophetic methodology leading to an 
apocalyptic outcome. For the last two decades, the continued rise of homegrown jihadist 
that has inspired terrorists to plot attacks in the United States is a clear indication that 
domestic Islamic radicalization is a threat to combat. 
1. Introduction and Background 
In 2014, ISIS grabbed the world’s attention with the spectacularly brutal violence 
that it unleashed throughout the Middle East. Just three years later, in 2017, ISIS suffered 
a massive defeat by the U.S.-led military coalition in Iraq and Syria. Despite the end of its 
physical caliphate, ISIS continues to pose a significant threat. Rather than encouraging 
foreign fighters to flock to a battlefield in Syria or Iraq, ISIS, using an ever-evolving array 
of tactics, is seeking to motivate and inspire attacks on foreign soil, including the United 
States, as well as in the Middle East and elsewhere. 
Ultimately, numerous attacks and plots worldwide are linked ISIS. In addition to 
the threat of terrorism from those abroad, the United States has witnessed the phenomenon 
of homegrown terrorists, posing a new kind of threat from within. To better repel this threat, 
counterterrorism policies in the United States need to ensure policymakers implement 
effective policies to mitigate this threat and focus on recruitment disengagement efforts. 
To that end, a range of experts has undertaken considerable deliberative discussions about 
the state and future of ISIS in the United States. Terrorist expert and author William 
McCants asserts, “the Islamic State is one of the most lethal and successful Salafi-jihadist 
groups in modern history.”122 To reinforce military efforts against the threat ISIS poses in 
Iraq and Syria, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) formally established the Combined 
Joint Task Force—Operation Inherent Resolve in October 2014. Its mission is to “continue 
to work by, with and through regional partners to militarily defeat the Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria, or ISIS, in order to enable whole-of-coalition governmental actions to increase  
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regional stability.”123 As of April 2018, the coalition has conducted 24,566 airstrikes and 
spent $1.43 billion on kinetic military operations related to countering ISIS.124 Yet, despite 
multiple operational defeats in 2017, ISIS continues to spread its extremist ideology 
worldwide and motivate individuals to commit acts of terror.  
In late 2014, U.S. Department of State (DOS) created the Global Coalition to Defeat 
ISIS; as the name emphasizes, it is an international coalition joined in the defeat of ISIS.125 
To promote conflict resolutions to compete with and ultimately suppress Salafi jihadist 
movements, both the U.S. government and its military need to sponsor significant security 
efforts both overseas and domestically to enable legitimate local governance to counter 
conditions and behaviors that allow ISIS to take root and thrive.126 However, it is 
challenging and often perplexing to hypothesize about measures to prevent domestic 
terrorism. The nature of terrorism has changed how the United States designs and develops 
policies for national security and law enforcement. Author Jonathan White claims terrorism 
is a social activity, specifying the concept that terrorism is organized by groups of people 
who define social reality and either sustain or change their beliefs. Even when a person 
acts individually, some social process is behind the person’s definition of reality.127 
2. Terrorism 
U.S. laws prohibit support for anti-American extremists abroad under the 1994 law 
regarding Providing Material Support to Terrorists, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A. This law prohibits 
any citizen or resident from supporting a foreign terrorist organization through 
providing money, property, lodging, training, or any or all assistance to an organization.128 
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However, if a person does support a foreign terrorist organization as ISIS is he or she 
identified as a terrorist or a criminal? Domestic terrorism in the United States lacks 
a traditional definition, and this causes confusion among agencies. Without a precise 
definition, there are multiple classification systems law-enforcement agencies use to define 
terrorism and terrorists, and it makes for a fundamental lack of clarity. Definitions vary 
from those who foster terrorist tactics to actors of influence. In 2017, Congress defined 
domestic terrorism as  
criminal conduct that takes place primarily in the United States and involves 
acts dangerous to human life that appear to be intended to either intimidate 
or coerce a group of people or to influence government policy through 
intimidation or coercion.129  
However, despite the differences, there is an agreement regarding the 
characteristics of terrorism, such as violence, and that the threat of terrorism is generally 
centered around specific behaviors. The defining commonality is the label terrorism or 
terrorist that manifests when the actors believe the violence they cause is justified and label 
themselves revolutionaries or freedom fighters. Author and terrorism expert Peter Brookes 
suggests that the term “terrorism” connotes violence or the threat of violence.130 Bruce 
Hoffman, another expert on terrorism, defines terrorism “as organized threat of political 
violence by a group that intentionally inflict psychological influence.”131 In yet another 
definition, DOS defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of force and violence against 
persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any 
segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”132 DHS defines terrorism 
in two ways133 
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• “International terrorism: Perpetrated by individuals and groups inspired by 
or associated with designated foreign terrorist organizations or nations.”134 
• “Domestic terrorism: Perpetrated by individuals and groups inspired by or 
associated with primarily U.S.-based movements that espouse extremist 
ideologies of a political, religious, social, racial, or environmental 
nature.”135 
3. Attacks on U.S. Soil 
The threat violent homegrown jihadi extremists present on America soil is 
substantial. Since 2014, there have been eleven ISIS-related attacks in the United States, 
costing 82 American lives and injuring over a hundred.136 Since the September 11 attacks, 
the terrorist threat to the United States has been perpetrated by homegrown jihadist 
individuals inspired by ISIS. “Jihadist terrorists use virtual and physical networks around 
the world to radicalize isolated individuals, exploit vulnerable populations, and inspire and 
direct plots”137 Because of the significant threat homegrown terrorism pose, policies and 
domestic counterterrorism measures must speak to the current increase of American-based 
ISIS supporters. The House Homeland Security Committee reports that since 2013, there 
have been 154 homegrown jihadists in the United States. The committee conducts a 
monthly assessment that highlights the growing threat that America, the West, and the 
world face from ISIS and other Islamist terrorists. Figure 1 presents a snapshot of the July 
2018 terror threat. 
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Figure 1. July 2018 Terror Threat Snapshot138 
Homegrown terrorists are produced through various means. There are individuals 
who radicalize because of experiences, and others who form connections with others 
associated with the terrorist group. For example, U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan, conducted 
a massive shooting spree in Fort Hood, Texas, that killed and wounded several military 
personnel. Nidal Hasan claimed he was influenced by the radical online preaching and 
propaganda disseminated by Anwar Awlaki, an American emir. Awlaki and Major Hasan 
138 Source: Homeland Security Committee, Terror Gone Viral. 
33 
communicated via email, and Hasan was inspired by Awlaki’s preaching and teachings of 
Islam and jihad.139  
National security needs to address the threat by this extreme, relentless, dangerous, 
and well-trained organization because Americans (like Major Hasan), who are driven by a 
radical concept of Islamic ideology,140 are deserting America and declaring war on its land 
and people. “Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has been 
grappling with how to reduce the growth and influence of Salafi jihadist groups whose 
goals directly threaten U.S. interests.”141 The successful formulation of counter strategies 
to disengage U.S. citizens from becoming radical is an essential task for the United States 
government.  
Without its operating bases in Syria and Iraq, ISIS is most likely to focus on 
encouraging and claiming credit for inspired attacks instead of directed and coordinated 
attacks. For example, in December 2017, an attempted bombing by Akayed Ullah targeted 
the New York Port Authority Bus Terminal, resulted in four people sustaining injuries. By 
focusing on counter-radicalization efforts both online and between local communities and 
federal authorities, we can decrease the potential for recruitment and increase cooperation 
within the United States. This will decrease incidents such as the one Ullah attempted to 
perpetuate.  
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II. ANALYSIS OF THE ISIS-INSPIRED 
HOMEGROWN THREAT 
Through the use of simple statistical data, the factors associated with the spread of 
ISIS-related crimes and homegrown terrorists in the United States can be reviewed. This 
chapter discusses U.S. citizens charged with ISIS crimes within the United States. In 
general, since the escalation of ISIS from 2014 to 2017, 82 individuals have been killed in 
the United States because of homegrown terrorists. 
A. PREVIOUS STUDIES 
The threat of homegrown terrorism and jihadi inspiration does exist in the United 
States.142 A homegrown jihadist terrorist is an American citizen or legal resident who plots 
an attack(s) in support of Islamic radicalization and theology. From all accounts, terrorism 
experts such as John M. Berger, William McCants, and Peter Brookes all agree that ISIS 
seeks to inspire Americans to implement a campaign of individual jihads within the United 
States.143 Brian Jenkins, who is a former U.S. Army Special Forces officer, a senior adviser 
at the RAND Corporation, a well-published author and an expert in terrorism, states, “The 
U.S. homeland faces a multilayered threat from terrorist organizations. Homegrown 
jihadists account for most of the terrorist activity in the United States since 9/11.”144 
Jenkins’s RAND report examined 178 U.S. citizens either who have conducted domestic 
jihadist terrorist attacks or who have been arrested for plotting an attack.  
This thesis uses two principal sources as information, the New America’s Terrorism 
in America After 9/11 and the George Washington University’s Program of Extremism. 
Terrorism in America After 9/11 is a compendium of homegrown terrorists that has tracked 
over 415 cases of individuals charged with homegrown terrorism. The George Washington 
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University’s Program on Extremism provides a thorough analysis of Americans who have 
joined ISIS and acted on its behalf. Additionally, researchers with the Program on 
Extremism has reviewed over 10,000 criminal complaints, indictments, affidavits, and 
courtroom transcripts of ISIS-related legal proceedings in the United States. The program’s 
data is an online collection reflecting the increasing number of individuals who have 
undergone ISIS radicalization and recruitment in the United States.145 When it comes to 
U.S. citizens supporting ISIS, quantitative research is sparse. However, the George 
Washington University Program on Extremism146 has identified three categories of 
homegrown ISIS-American terrorists: a foreign fighter (one who travels abroad to fight 
in support of the group); a domestic plotter (one who lives in and plans an attack in 
the United States); and the domestic supporter of the group (one who provides it with 
material support).147 
B. ISIS SUPPORTERS IN THE UNITED STATES  
As of May 2018, 161 U.S. citizens have been charged with ISIS-related offenses 
(since the beginning of 2015), and 108 have been found guilty of either ISIS-related support 
or activity.148 In contrast, in 2014, a total of 32 were founded guilty of supporting ISIS. 
As of this writing, the following is an updated profile of a domestic ISIS supporter (these 
numbers have shown an increase since 2014)149 (see Figure 2):  
• Average age is 28,  
• 90 percent are male, 
• 13.4 years is the average sentence,  
• 28 states have cases where a homegrown terrorist was charged, 
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• 41 percent are suspected foreign fighters  
• 33 percent participated in plotting an attack, and 
• 56 percent arrested in operations involving informants and undercover 
agents.150 
Figure 2.  George Washington Extremism Tracker, May 2018151 
 
 
The George Washington University’s study specifies charges categorized by the 
percentage of individuals attempting to travel abroad, the percentage of individuals accused 
of plotting attacks, and the percentage of individuals arrested for an operation involving 
either informant or an undercover agent. Also incorporated are the percentages of ISIS-
related arrests within each state across the United States. For example, in December 2015,  
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there were a total of 71 ISIS arrests in 21 states. According to the George Washington 
University data, the top three states for ISIS arrests for that period were New York (13), 
Minnesota (11), and California (5). In April of 2018, 28 states have ISIS arrests with the 
top three were New York (28), Virginia (17) and Minnesota (15).152 All charged with 
supporting a known foreign terrorist organization. Moreover, some have also been charged 
with other infractions, such as false information to authorities, passport fraud, or weapons 
possession. 
In December of 2017 in an oversight hearing, FBI Director Christopher Wray stated 
“currently, the FBI views ISIS and homegrown violent extremists as main terrorism threats 
to the United States.”153 Six months later, in May 2018, for the fifth time in three years, 
DHS raised the warning of homegrown terrorism threats. The threat spurred the Trump 
administration to declare that ISIS continues to be a security threat.154 Moreover, as Figure 
3 indicates, the number of Americans charged for engaging in ISIS-related activities has 
increased substantially in recent years. As noted earlier, this is primarily due to the power 
and role of the Internet, existing networks of friends and family that enable recruitment, 
and anti-Muslim rhetoric. This thesis primarily focuses on the first two factors, but the third 
should not be dismissed as unimportant. 
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Figure 3.  Increase in Number of Americans Charged for ISIS-Related Activities 
 
 
In December of 2015, a total of 56 U.S. citizens were arrested for terrorism in 
21 states across the country, which were holding a total of 71 Americans charged with 
ISIS-related activities that year.155 By December of 2017, a total of 153 U.S. citizen have 
been charged with ISIS-related offenses that spread across 28 states.156 Homegrown ISIS-
inspired terrorist does show an increase throughout this period.  
C. ISIS-RELATED ATTACKS IN THE UNITED STATES 
The information below includes the number of ISIS-related fatalities and injuries 
from attacks executed in the United States. The GW Extreme Tracker drew these sums 
from 2014 to 2018 from a CNN compilation of ISIS-connected incidents in the United  
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States. Since 2014 and the declaration of the caliphate, ISIS has conducted and inspired 
hundreds of global attacks. In the United States from 2014 to 2017, there were 11 attacks 
that killed 82 and injured 137 citizens. All of these attacks were executed by individuals 
inspired by ISIS, typically by online propaganda; however, many of them did not have 
direct contact with an ISIS member overseas. Here is a look at ISIS-inspired attacks in the 
United States, conducted by homegrown terrorists (also see Figure 4):  
• “On October 23, 2014, in an attack known as the “Queens hatchet attack,” 
a recent convert to Islam and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) 
supporter attacked two police officers with a hatchet. One civilian was 
wounded when other officers attempted to shoot the attacker.”157 
• “On May 3, 2015, in the Curtis Culwell Center attack in Garland Texas, two 
individuals attached police officers with gunfire at an exhibit featuring 
cartoon images of Muhammad.”158 
• “November 4, 2015, at the University of California, Merced, Faisal 
Mohammad stabbed four people before being shot to death by police. 
Authorities concluded the attack ISIS related and inspired.”159 
• “On December 2, 2015, in the San Bernardino, California, attack, married 
couple Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik opened fire on a holiday 
party at the Inland Regional Center before fleeing. The wife had sworn 
allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in a Facebook post the day of the 
massacre. The couple killed 14 people and injured 24.”160  
• “January 8, 2016, Edward Archer was arrested in Philadelphia after 
shooting police officer Jesse Hartnett, who survived the attack. Archer 
committed the offense in support of ISIS.”161 
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• “On June 12, 2016, Omar Mateen, a 29-year-old security guard, killed 49 
people and wounded 53 others with gunfire in a terrorist attack-/hate crime 
inside Pulse, a gay nightclub in Orlando, Florida.”162  
• “On July 16, 2015, Mohammad Abdulazeez killed five people in shootings 
at two military facilities in Chattanooga, Tennessee.”163 
• “In September 2016, in New York City, 30 people were injured when a 
homemade bomb exploded in the Chelsea neighborhood.”164 
• “On November 2016 in the Ohio State University attack, Abdul Razak Ali 
Artan stabbed people and ran others over with a car, injuring 11. ISIS 
praised the attack.”165  
• “In October 2017 in the New York City truck attack, a driver used a flatbed 
pickup truck as a weapon to strike pedestrians on the bike path in Lower 
Manhattan, New York City; eight were killed, and 12 were injured.”166 
• “In December 2017, in the New York City attempted bombing attack, 
Akayed Ullah, age 27, tried a suicide bombing at the 42nd Street-Port 
Authority Bus Terminal. The crude pipe bomb injured four people, 
including the bomber.”167 
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Figure 4. 100+ ISIS Linked Terrorism Plots168 
Currently, there are about 900 active investigations of homegrown terrorists who 
are suspected ISIS supporters.169 Whereas after 9/11, there have been 103 fatalities from 
terrorists on U.S. soil, and 90 percent of the individuals involved in Islamist extremist 
plots in the United States were U.S. citizens, which suggests that the threat tends to be 
homegrown.170 Based on reports noted in this thesis and the number of ISIS-inspired arrests 
during the period from 2014 to 2017, there is an influx of ISIS influence spreading in the 
United States. The House Homeland Security Committee has tracked ISIS activity after the 
168 Source: Homeland Security Committee, Terror Gone Viral. 
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first known plot against the West in 2014. Its report captures ISIS’s external operations 
against the United States and inspired plots. Figure 4 provides a snapshot of ISIS-linked 
plots and attacks by country since 2013. 
D. AMERICANS RECRUITED FOR JIHAD 
Americans are being recruited to migrate to jihadist battlefields in Syria to fight 
with ISIS. Authorities have stopped some Americans on the pathway to jihad, but others 
have successfully made it to the conflict zones. Some have been killed there, and others 
have returned to the United States. These American jihadists pose a counterterrorism 
challenge for the United States. ISIS has motivated the mobilization of extremists in the 
United States from 2014 to date, and more than 250 Americans have traveled or made an 
effort to travel overseas to join the Islamic State.171  
A small cluster of Americans have become attracted to ISIS’s ideology and taken a 
path supporting ISIS directly on foreign soil. Chapter III outlines the intensity of U.S.-
based foreign fighters that have traveled to ISIS battlefield. A cluster of supporters is 
considered a small informal group of like-minded people with the same beliefs. These 
clusters are real connections between individuals bound together by a commitment and 
loyalty to ISIS. These bonds are formed in mosques, student groups, or in counties where 
there is a diaspora of a specific ethnic group. Groups as these are typically founded in 
Europe, but also on a significantly smaller scale in the United States, mainly because most 
ISIS-inspired supporters who are American fall into a lone actor profile. However, 
individuals who radicalized and mobilized together have a unique and strong 
connection.172 A high profile United States case that illustrates this cluster dynamics is 
known as the Minnesota cluster. The next chapter features 24 individuals who have 
attempted to travel to join ISIS since 2014; this is the largest cluster identified from this 
wave of Minnesota ISIS supporters. The actual threat to our nation is homegrown lone 
wolves or groups of individuals who are inspired by jihadist ideology. Most Americans 
                                                 
171 Bergen et al., Jihadist Terrorism.  
172 Lorenzo Vidino and Seamus Hughes, ISIS in America: From Retweets to Raqqa (Washington, DC: 
Program of Extremism, George Washington University, 2015), https://extremism.gwu.edu/isis-america.  
44 
believe that foreign terrorists are who plots attacks against America and that an attack could 
not be conducted by a U.S. citizen, yet Omar Mateen, was born and raised in New York, 
and he executed the deadliest jihadi-inspired attack since the September 11th attacks.173 
E. CONCLUSION 
The data gathered from studies discussed in this chapter illuminate the complexity 
of the ISIS homegrown threat and confirm that American political leaders will need to be 
valiant in both addressing and mitigating this threat. Although other fundamental Islamic-
motivated terrorist groups have attracted Westerners for decades, the success of ISIS 
recruitment and motivation efforts have dramatically increased from 2014 to 2018. For 
several decades, few Americans have been lured by Islamic extremists waging jihadi, yet 
ISIS had changed the dynamics with its appeal to capture Americans at an increasing 
rate.174 To protect our homeland and people from this increasing threat that homegrown 
ISIS-inspired terrorists have manifested into our society, our leaders must develop and 
implement innovative policies and initiatives. Yes, the numbers of deaths from homegrown 
ISIS-inspired terrorists are relatively low compared to the other threats our national 
security faces. However, the United States is not resistant to ISIS or the risk it poses.  
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III. A SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS OF THE MINNESOTA 
ISLAMIC STATE CLUSTER 
Kinship recruitment suggests that radicalization is a small-group 
phenomenon whereby valued peers with extremist ideas transpose their 
extremism onto apolitical individuals within their orbit through social and 
psychological mechanisms that are devoid of grievances, ideology, or 
politics, but instead associated with love, trust, and life-long bonding. 
—Mohammed M. Hafez175 
This chapter examines a network surrounding a group of Minnesota men who 
attempted to flee to Syria from 2013 to 2015 to support ISIS. Using public open-source 
data, I reconstructed the network centered around six codefendants. The reports from which 
the network data were gleaned included numerous newspaper articles, thousands of pages 
of legal documents, law enforcement reports, and interviews. Also, the Program on 
Extremism’s landmark 2015 report, ISIS in America: From Retweets to Raqqa, provided 
groundwork information for understanding ISIS followers in the United States.176 The 
program also publishes the monthly The Extremism Tracker, which details current ISIS 
activity, and the Telegram Tracker, which compiles all pro-ISIS channels on social 
media.177 Beginning with six codefendants from the 2015 criminal complaint charging six 
Minnesota males who conspired together to travel to Syria to join ISIS,178 the network was 
initially expanded to include 18 additional Minnesota individuals who are also ISIS 
supporters. These individuals were linked together by friendship or kinship ties, and they 
also attempted to or did flee to Syria. An additional 16 individuals were identified as having 
friendship or kinship ties to the other 24 network members but did not try to join ISIS. 
Including them in the network brought the total to 40 individuals.  
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This chapter proceeds as follows. It explores the significance of the cluster of 
sympathizers in Minnesota. Next, it draws on social network analysis (SNA) to gain a 
better understanding of the Minnesota network (see appendix). The chapter concludes with 
strategies for deterring people from joining ISIS.  
A. BACKGROUND  
The war on terror and terrorism is of crucial concern to our national security. Since 
September 11, the U.S. government has spent a substantial amount of resources on 
terrorism prevention. Additionally, the global war on terror has brought about changes in 
both our domestic and foreign policies. Many researchers are trying to identify specific 
trends or patterns that trigger an individual’s desire to join a terrorist group.179 However, 
one size does not fit all since homegrown terrorists can be potentially radicalized by their 
grievances, the networks in which they are embedded, or their ideological learnings. In this 
chapter, I map a network of terrorist supporters in Minnesota who are self-proclaimed 
jihadists. This network is the first ever to exist where over two dozen individuals can be 
linked to a specific location—St Paul Minneapolis, Minnesota—who support ISIS.  
Minnesota has the largest Somali immigrant cluster, of the 150,000 Somalis who 
live in the United States,180 and a 2015 report by the U.S. House Committee on Homeland 
Security found that Minnesota has the highest number of people attempting to travel to 
Syria to join ISIS.181 In-depth research and analysis indicate that Minneapolis-St. Paul is a 
“perfect storm” of citizens who have become radicalized jihadists because of existing 
networks and past conflicts they have experienced. For example, in 2006, during the 
invasion of Somalia by Ethiopian forces, a jihadist group known as al-Shabaab surfaced, 
in Somali, which was plunged into civil war. This caused a ripple effect with many foreign 
fighters fleeing to Somalia to support al-Shabaab.182 With its high percentage of Somali 
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immigrants, Minnesota was affected by this as well; 23 men from the Twin Cities fled to 
Somalia from 2007 to 2013 to join al-Shabaab.183 
Muslims have immigrated to Minnesota since the 1880s with an increase in 
numbers in the 1990s because of refugees from Somalia, Bosnia, and East Africa.184 
Estimates indicate that as of 2017, 3.45 million Muslims live in the United States 
(approximately 1.1 percent of the U.S. population).185 In 2018, the percentage of 
Minnesota’s adult Muslim population was between one and two percent.186 The inflow of 
Muslims from Somalia, Bosnia, and East Africa in the 1990s expanded the U.S. Muslim 
population, primarily in Minnesota.187 This geographical clustering, plus the peer-to-peer 
friendships and kinship relationships, radiates the potential for extremism.  
The Minnesota jihadi cluster was comprised of the dozens of residents from 
Minnesota who support ISIS. The network visualizations later in the chapter depict the 
degree to which the network is interconnected. The ISIS supporters who successfully 
traveled to Syria also attempted to recruit family and friends back in the United States by 
contacting them via phone or on social media sites as Facebook message or on Facebook 
pages.188  
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B. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS—PATTERNS AND UNDERSTANDINGS 
A primary goal of SNA has been to develop metrics that help analysts gain 
a better understanding of a particular network’s structural features.189  
—Sean Everton  
This section’s purpose is to conduct an exploratory SNA of ISIS-inspired 
homegrown terrorists in the United States. In 1975, military planners realized the SNA 
approach could be productive in identifying terrorist groups. Witnessing the success of 
these systems by the military, federal government personnel speculated that the software 
and identification methods could be useful to law enforcement to disrupt gangs and 
organized crime rings.190 
Everton defines SNA as “a collection of theories and methods that assumes that the 
behavior of actors (e.g., individuals, groups, or organizations) is profoundly affected by 
their ties to others and the networks in which they are embedded.”191 This chapter’s 
analysis maps a network of citizens who have a pledged an oath to ISIS and have either 
left the country to travel to Syria to join the group or were planning to and were caught by 
authorities before they could depart the United States. In 2014, federal investigators 
estimated that about 20 young people had left Minnesota to join ISIS.192 Authorities 
stopped and arrested many at airports as they tried to leave.  
Everton observes, “Social networks not only enable and constrain behavior but that 
they are also full of meaning and as such help, us make sense of our world, shape our 
preference and influences the choices we make.”193 SNA has become a tool for analysts to 
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study the complexities of understanding dynamics among people, and it is especially useful 
in diagnosing Islamic extremists.194 Marc Sageman states,  
A group of people can be viewed as a network, a collection of nodes 
connected through links. Some nodes are more popular and attached to more 
links in which connects them to more isolated nodes. These more connected 
nodes, called hubs, are important components of terrorist networks.195  
With this in mind, SNA enables us to better understand interaction patterns and behaviors. 
The work of previous social network analysts, such as Validis Kerbs, who studied the 9/11 
hijacker network, and Marc Sageman, who examined 172 Islamic terrorist operatives of 
the global Salafi jihadis, can be referred to for further analysis.196  
In SNA, the term actor “refers to discrete individuals, subgroups, organizations, 
collectivities, communities, or nation-states involved in social relations.”197 These actors 
are linked together by ties.198 The Minnesota jihadi cluster draws upon friendship and 
biological relations as ties. As this network suggests, actors are clustered within 
subcategories (friendship, kinship, travelers, and ISIS supporters). Commonly rooted 
within a subgroup, others serve as a bridge between subgroups.199  
This study examines the complicated relationship of the U.S. citizens who have 
supported ISIS. Using SNA, it presents a visualization of the network and potential 
clusters. This visualization, known as a sociogram, is built from complex computations. 
Through quantitative and analytical methodology, these computations display the 
dynamics of complex relationships.200 Everton states the importance of metrics.  
Social network metrics play an important role in analyzing a social network’s 
dynamics. Density and other related measures can help researchers gain an overall 
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understanding the overall “shape” of the network (i.e., its topography); centrality 
measures can help identify key and peripheral actors within a network; clustering 
algorithms can help locate various subgroups within the larger network (and also 
provide additional information on the network as a whole); and brokerage measures 
can help identify actors and ties between actors that serve as channels for the 
exchange and flow of information and other resources (e.g., financial, affection). 
Social network analysts generally use a variety of metrics (rather than just one or 
two) in their attempts to gain an overall understanding of a network.201 
As noted earlier, beginning with the six codefendants, I expanded the network using 
primarily friendship and kinship ties. Although I could have used other types of ties to 
expand the network, existing research suggests that friendship and kinship networks play 
key roles in the development of terrorist and other types of clandestine networks.202 For 
instance, Sageman established that the majority that joined the global Salafi jihad were 
recruited through friendship and kinship ties.203  
Friendship ties appear to be particularly key to the Minnesota network. As 
Meleagrou-Hitchens, Hughes, and Clifford note, “Unlike its counterparts, which usually 
involve isolated groups of two or three members, the Minnesota cluster transcended several 
friendship and family groups.”204 This cluster mobilized through ties of various 
friendships, coupled with communication among each other and interconnectivity by in-
person contact or through a cell phone or social media message boards. Group members 
encouraged and enabled each other to travel or support ISIS through illegal online material. 
Figure 5 presents the Minnesota ISIS cluster’s friendship network where red indicates the 
original codefendants. The friendship network’s density, which equals the proportion of 
actual ties over the number of potential ties, is 0.202. 
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Figure 5.    Minnesota Cluster Friendship Network 
Kinship also plays an essential role in radicalization. As Mohammed Hafez notes, 
“Kinship recruitment, which is difficult for security agencies to observe, is facilitated by 
several psychological mechanisms that bind persons together towards extremism.”205 The 
bond of loyalty strengthens commitments and trust, especially in a radicalization context. 
Kinship networks are made of individuals who have similar beliefs and a collective identity 
permitting their interactions to be innocuous.206 The lifelong bond, mixed with love and 
trust, indicates that this revised concept of the ideology of Islamic extremism allows active 
recruitment to radicalization. Figure 6 presents the Minnesota ISIS cluster’s kinship 
network where once again red indicates the original codefendants. The kinship network’s 
density equals 0.039; this is substantially lower than the friendship network, which 
indicates that this particular support network is built more on friendship than kinship ties. 
Of course, we cannot assume that other networks that support ISIS will demonstrate this 
same pattern. 
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Figure 6.  Minnesota Cluster Kinship Network 
To be included in the network for this research, an individual had to be a resident 
of Minnesota, have a friendship or kinship tie to at least one of the six codefendants or one 
of the other 18 ISIS supporters, and meet one or more of the following criteria: 
• Arrested for plotting to travel to Syria/Iraq to support ISIS,
• Successfully traveled to Syria/Iraq and fought with ISIS,
• Conspired or attempted to kill abroad in support of a foreign terrorist
organization,
• Conspired or attempted to provide material support to ISIS.
Figure 7 presents the combined network. In the figure, the red nodes indicate the 
six codefendants, green edges indicates friendship ties, and blue edges indicate kinship ties. 
All the individuals in this network are U.S. citizens from Minnesota and Muslim 
Americans. Not all are homegrown terrorists, yet their inclusion shows how interconnected 
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this cluster is. Network total density equals 0.242, which suggests that compared to other 
dark networks, it is moderately connected.207 
Figure 7. Minnesota Cluster Overall Network 
This study’s purpose is to examine the globalization of ISIS’s ideology that has 
successfully resulted in radicalization and mobilization. Americans declaring an oath to 
this foreign terrorist organization affects national security. These individuals are 
Americans who have freely volunteered to wage war against their country (i.e., the United 
States), to abandon the American way of life, and to support ISIS. They are U.S. citizens 
who have plotted terrorist attacks within our borders and have declared jihad against the 
United States.  
C. THE MINNESOTA TRAVELERS 
Extremists call all Muslims to jihad as an obligation and duty to Islam. As Reynolds 
and Hafez point out, “Muslim foreign fighters declare their Islamist views as a total ‘war 
on Islam’ that tyrannical regimes and foreign enemies threaten to subjugate Muslims.”208 
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They also note that “Western jihadists participate in foreign conflicts because they see 
fighting in Muslim lands as legitimate self-defense, not an act of aggression.”209 
Furthermore, the George Washington University report, The Travelers, suggests that 
knowing the flashpoint as to why an individual would radicalize and support ISIS is 
complex.210 
In 2007, two dozen individuals from Minnesota with Somali origins left the United 
States to join al-Shabaab.211 Known originally as the Minnesota travelers, they were the 
first cluster in the United States to flee to become foreign fighters. The group analyzed in 
this chapter is the second. As noted earlier, beginning with six individuals convicted for 
attempting to travel to Syria in order to join ISIS, I identified an additional 18 individuals 
connected to these six through friendship or kinship ties and who either fled or attempted 
to flee to Syria to become foreign fighters. According to Meleagrou-Hitchens, Hughes, and 
Clifford, 
The Minnesotan contingent in Syria and Iraq is well documented. The court 
cases against the ten unsuccessful travelers revealed a wealth of information 
regarding other Twin Cities residents who successfully traveled. A U.S. 
House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee report found that 
more than one-quarter of successful and unsuccessful U.S. travelers came 
from Minnesota. During a 2015 press conference, then–U.S. Attorney 
Andrew Luger, responsible for prosecuting the majority of Minnesota’s IS-
related cases, was more direct in his assessment: We have a terror recruiting 
problem in Minnesota.212 
The first foreign fighters who headed to Syria from Minnesota began recruitment 
internally with their friends and family in the United States. Former U.S. Attorney Andrew 
Luger described this as, “a recruiting strategy as a ‘peer-to-peer’, ‘brother-to-brother’ 
approach, noting, the person radicalizing your son, your brother, your friend, may not be a 
stranger. It may be their best friend right here in town.”213 Figure 8 depicts the network 
209 Reynolds and Hafez, 3.  
210 Meleagrou-Hitchens, Hughes, and Clifford, The Travelers, 85.  
211 George Washington University, “Program of Extremism.”  
212 Meleagrou-Hitchens, Hughes, and Clifford, The Travelers, 116. 
213 Meleagrou-Hitchens, Hughes, and Clifford, 116.  
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with the nodes colored by whether or not they attempted to travel to Syria in order to join 
ISIS. Red nodes indicate the original six codefendants, purple nodes (14) indicate those 
who successfully traveled to Syria, green (4) indicate those who attempted (but failed) to 
travel to Syria, and gray (16) indicates individuals who are associated through kinship and 
friendship ties but did not attempt to travel to Syria; it is unknown whether they are ISIS 
supporters.  
Figure 8.    Combined Minnesota Cluster Network Colored by Traveler Status 
Table 1 summarizes the average centrality scores of network members, broken 
down by their traveler status. Degree centrality is a count of the number of ties of an actor; 
betweenness centrality indicates the extent to which actors lie between other actors in the 
network; closeness measures how close, on average, each actors is to every other actor in 
the network; and eigenvector captures the degree to which actors are connected to other 
well-connected actors. Table 1 illustrates that the six original codefendants score highest 
on three out of the four measures. This is unsurprising since the construction of this network 
began with these six individuals; thus, we would expect them to be the most central. 
However, it is interesting that those who attempted to travel (whether successfully or not) 
score much higher in terms of centrality than those who did not attempt to travel. We know 
from previous research that individuals who are on the periphery of a group (in this case, 
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the “non-travelers”) are less likely to ascribe to the group’s norms,214 so these results 
indicate that those who were more weakly tied to the core of the Minnesota cluster were 
less likely to be influenced by those who wanted to join ISIS in Syria. However, they still 
could have been able to exert an influence on core members, which suggests that a possible 
course of action would have been to identify individuals on the periphery as possible 
“entry” points for diminishing the group’s enthusiasm for joining ISIS. 












Codefendants 19.50 0.054 0.657 0.385 
Attempted to 
Travel 15.50 0.082 0.597 0.291 
Successfully 
Traveled 8.50 0.023 0.530 0.167 
Non-travelers 5.00 0.004 0.443 0.086 
To consider a strategy design to assist law enforcement in considering potential 
actions plans to thwart the process of radicalization of terrorist supporters in the United 
States, the U.S. government should consider game theory. The Minnesota cluster shows a 
small cell in the United States that formed together to engage in terrorism; however, on the 
broader scale, over 30,000 foreign fighters traveled to Syria to join ISIS (only 
approximately 129215 from the U.S., however). What accounts for their behavior? 
Thomas Schelling introduced the world to his “theory of strategy,” an 
adaptation of game theory to the world of international relations. In his 
book, The Strategy of Conflict, Schelling coined the concept of a “focal 
214 For example, see Pamela A. Popielarz, and J. Miller McPherson, “On the Edge or in Between: 
Niche Position, Niche Overlap, and the Duration of Voluntary Association Memberships,” American 
Journal of Sociology 101, no. 3 (1995):698–720; Sean F. Everton, Networks and Religion: Ties the Bind, 
Loose, Build-up, and Tear Down (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 116–120.  
215 Richard Barrett, Beyond the Caliphate: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees (New York: 
Soufan Center, 2017), http://thesoufancenter.org/research/beyond-caliphate/.  
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point” (now known as a “Schelling point”) to describe how individuals and 
nations reach an agreement when bargaining with each other. The process 
involves anticipating what the other person or country might do.216  
The next chapter discusses considerations for policymakers in designing strategies that 
undercuts ISIS’s ability to recruit and the core of Islamic radicalization in the United States. 
D. CONCLUSION  
ISIS’ media strategy is like its military strategy; intentional, broad, 
comprehensive, and most of all patient.  
—Craig Whiteside, Lighting the Path217 
This chapter presented an overview of a cluster of American foreign fighters who 
are ISIS supporters. The Minnesota jihadi cluster shows how individuals are interconnected 
with others via relationships, religion, and ethnicity as well as a shared set of grievances, 
namely the perception that the United States is at war with Islam. SNA can identify links 
and the depth of connectedness, which can assist authorities in arresting potential terrorists 
or in their deradicalization efforts. This chapter’s analysis highlights the need for further 
community engagement programs in at-risk communities, to stop the active appeal 
extremists have within this population. In particular, it demonstrated that those who 
attempted to join ISIS were located more at the core of the network than those who did not, 
suggesting that those on the periphery could have been used by authorities to counter the 
group’s enthusiasm for joining ISIS. It is important to note, however, that this analysis is 
not conclusive because the main problem with open-source data is the incompleteness of 
information, especially in dark networks, as homegrown terrorists. Just as importantly, it 
only examines a single network of individuals who attempted to flee to Syria from 2013 to 
2015 to support ISIS; we cannot assume that other ISIS-related networks in the U.S. are 
structured in the same way.  
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IV. USING GAME THEORY TO ANALYZE U.S. CITIZENS WHO 
SUPPORT THE ISLAMIC STATE 
First, if the insurgency is able to maintain a positive rate of growth, over 
time it will eventually reach the point where it can either defeat or displace 
its opponent. Second, if its net rate of growth after attrition stabilizes short 
of what is needed to win, but is still sufficient to allow it to stay in the game, 
the conflict can continue indefinitely. This will not change until the 
underlying parameters of the struggle change in a way that gives one side 
or the other a game-winning advantage, or changing political circumstances 
permit the players to achieve a negotiated ending. Finally, if the original 
charter group is unable to grow much beyond the size of its opening 
membership, it will not pose a significant political challenge. It may 
continue to be a political irritant, until defeated, without ever becoming big 
enough to pose a threat. When it comes to waging an internal war, as the 
saying goes, size matters.  
—Gordon McCormick and Frank Giordano218 
The threat of homegrown ISIS-inspired terrorist in the United States is complicated. 
Focusing on counter-radicalization efforts between local communities and federal 
authorities could decrease the potential for recruitment. The Minnesota cluster, a group of 
Americans who have become foreign fighters, highlights a specific location (Minnesota) 
as a place where community efforts to decrease recruitment could prevent radicalization. 
To offer policymakers possible solutions and policy recommendations, this chapter uses a 
game theory model to demonstrate that if the U.S. government decreases counter violence 
extremism (CVE) funding, it could affect national security. Domestic CVE efforts focusing 
on deradicalization and disengagement within community engagement programs have the 
best chance of showing an effective strategy. For example, The Program on Extremism 
stated, “CVE is a delicate tool that, if properly implemented, can help sway young people away 
from radicalizing. Apart from saving lives, prevention programs outside law enforcement allow 
law enforcement and intelligence agencies to better concentrate their resources on those who 
have made the leap into violent militancy.”219 Current CVE efforts in the United States 
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should pivot to lessons learned from faults and accomplishments to develop a program that 
reduces the threat of ISIS radicalization of U.S. citizens.220 Since 2013, the NCTC, the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ), and the FBI have focused on engaging with local 
communities identified as vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment by violent jihadists 
throughout the United States to enhance community outreach initiatives and implement 
counterterrorism efforts.  
A. THE DILEMMA: HOMEGROWN TERRORISTS INSPIRED BY 
JIHADIST IDEOLOGY 
Through exploration of game theory methods, this chapter examines the possible 
consequences of decreasing funding for CVE and other community-based programming 
and the potential effects it will have on homegrown terrorists recruiting efforts. The threat 
of homegrown terrorists is substantial and mandates that the United States implement 
strategic initiatives to protect the nation. ISIS has proven its ability to lure people to become 
sympathizers, travel aboard, and plot attacks to further its agenda. ISIS has used the 
Internet, including various social media platforms, to launch informational campaigns that 
reaches beyond boundaries and borders with propaganda that appeals to multiple 
audiences, and through these efforts, it has gained recruits.  
The nation is not winning against Islamic extremism, despite our counterterrorism 
measures. There are more jihadi fighters and battlefields today than any other time in 
history, and some of those fighters have come from the United States.221 The threat 
environment today is fragile and vulnerable because terrorists are recruiting and promoting 
on multiple platforms, such as the Internet and person-to-person within communities. 
Counterterrorism efforts and initiatives require resources, which are costly. However, 
adequate funding and resources must remain a priority towards domestic terrorism 
prevention programs and policies in order to safeguard American citizens’.222 Ultimately, 
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collaboration involving the Department of Education and the Department of Health and 
Human Services, as well as both state and local governments, is necessary to adequately 
protect the nation from ISIS or Islamic extremism recruitment and radicalization. In 2011, 
the U.S. government created a national strategic plan to address domestic CVE within the 
federal government. CVE introduced cooperative measures between individual 
communities, religious leaders, health-service employees, and law enforcement.223 DHS 
defines CVE as “proactive actions to counter efforts by extremists to recruit, radicalize, 
and mobilize followers to violence.”224 CVE was designed to deter U.S. citizens from 
joining violent extremist groups and provide information, awareness, and resources into 
vulnerable communities.  
B. DOMESTIC COUNTERTERRORISM IN AMERICA 
The events after 9/11 changed the U.S. government’s counterterrorism community. 
In her article “Preventing the Next Attack,” Monaco explains,  
Determined to “connect the dots” in the future, the U.S. government created 
new agencies and instituted a new paradigm for intelligence—share by rule, 
withhold by exception—and set up a slew of “fusion centers” and joint task 
forces to foster interagency cooperation. Borders were hardened, cockpit 
doors reinforced, and watch lists created.225  
In light of this evolving threat, the question becomes, what is the right strategy to use to 
counteract this new phase of terrorism when the threat comes from a wide array of 
individuals without a specific profile and no way to determine if the potential danger lies 
with a radicalized lone wolf or a radicalized cluster of people with the intent to create 
disaster on American or foreign soil. 
In 2011, DHS released an initiative entitled Empowering Local Partners to Prevent 
Violent Extremism in the United States,226 which represents a strategy the USG uses to 
empower and assist local communities in the prevention of violent extremism. With the 
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evolving threat of violent extremists in 2016, the administration released the Strategic 
Implementation Plan (SIP),227 which reflected on the dynamics of the previous five years 
in the prevention of violent extremism. The 2016 SIP is designed to prevent recruitment 
and radicalization among vulnerable individuals who are susceptible to becoming 
influenced and motivated by radical Islamic ideology.228 These efforts are through the 
following lines of effort, enhancing engagement with support to local communities, 
building government and law enforcement expertise for preventing violent extremism, and 
countering violent extremist propaganda while promoting our ideals.229 The purpose of SIP 
is to prevent the development and proliferation of violent extremist threats that continue to 
evolve on U.S. soil.  
The terrorist threat that the nation faces does not come from individuals outside of 
our borders; it comes from homegrown U.S. citizens that have been increasingly influenced 
by ISIS and other extreme Islamic ideologies. Since 2001 and because of the events that 
took place on 9/11, the United States has pioneered cutting-edge counterterrorism tactics 
and strategies to safeguard our citizens and borders, and it has become the world’s 
counterterrorism leader at significant fiscal cost. Since 9/11, the discretionary budget 
spends 16 percent on counterterrorism efforts and incorporates homeland security, 
international programs, and in conflict regions, such as Iraq and Syria; the overall total has 
been 2.8 trillion dollars.230 In 2017, approximately $174 billion was spent on 
counterterrorism efforts. In comparison, this yearly average exceeds what the U.S. 
government spent combined annually for the Korean and Vietnam Wars.231  
Since September 11, 2001, significant actions have been implemented by the 
United States to disrupt terrorists to ensure the nation is protected. Our nation’s efforts have 
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been remarkable. However, despite the trillions of dollars the U.S. government has spent 
on counterterrorism efforts, including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan domestically and 
internationally to protect the homeland, homegrown terrorists, radicalized by Islamist 
groups, such ISIS, remain a threat to the United States. Individuals who become radicalized 
are nearly impossible for the U.S. government and law enforcement agencies to detect 
because they have no easily identified triggers, many have been lone-wolves, most have 
never been to a foreign country (much less a conflict area), and few have had any tactical 
training.  
In 2011, the government established the Countering Violent Extremism Task Force 
(CVETF) to unify all agencies on the CVE frontline. The purpose of the CVETF is to 
connect people, ideas, and opportunities relating to counterterrorism. The task force’s 
mission statement is “to manage the synchronization and integration of a whole-of-
government effort to empower local partners to prevent violent extremism in the United 
States.”232 The following departments and agencies, charged with continuing to execute 
this strategy, support the CVETF: DHS, Department of Justice, DOS, DOD, Department 
of Education, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Labor, the FBI, 
the U.S. Agency for International Development, and NCTC.233 George Selim, Director of 
the DHS’s Office for Community Partnerships and the head of the CVE program, has 
described CVE as “the first federal assistance program devoted exclusively to providing 
local communities with the resources to counter violent extremism in the homeland that 
supports new and existing community-based efforts to counter violent extremist 
recruitment and radicalization to violence.”234 However, since the resignation of George 
Selim in 2018, significant budgets cuts for community organizations within the CVE 
program, and the reevaluation of the program, has caused the future of community 
engagement programs within CVE to be unknown at this time.   
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In late 2016, President Obama approved $10 million of grant funding for a total of 
31 organizations in support of CVE.235 This finding is significant to DHS and its specific 
objectives of deradicalization and recruitment prevention. However, when President 
Trump’s administration took office in 2017, it reevaluated and assessed all programs and 
initiatives across the federal government and implemented budget cuts. Although this 
assessment process kept the $10 million in grant funding, it dissolved the financing of four 
organizations within the homeland security department of CVE.236 The pivot of this 
decision shifted grants from community engagement efforts to funding mainly efforts of 
law enforcement and other government agencies. The current administration’s decrease in 
funding for DHS programs aimed at CVE community deradicalization efforts with 
community engagement programs is unfortunate because the program was designed to 
engage Muslim communities where the population is at high risk for recruitment and 
radicalization.237 Community engagement programs within Muslim communities at risk 
for ISIS recruitment and radicalization have the potential to foster positive influence 
regarding disengagement with ISIS efforts.  
There are no easy solutions. The government needs to address the national debt, 
law enforcement does still require additional funding, and the government needs to dissolve 
homegrown terrorism. However, studies have proven that an effective method to counter 
homegrown terrorism is through engagement in the communities with family members and 
religious leaders.238  
C. GAME THEORY 
Game theory is the science of decision making. In a 2012 chapter entitled “Game 
Theory Application on Terrorism,” Pavelková states,  
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The concept of the game in modern Game Theory has a very general 
meaning, but applies to any situation of conflict between individuals, 
companies, armies, states, political parties, and biological species.239  
Game theory uses not only a scientific, mathematical apparatus but also psychology and 
economics concepts as well. The objective of game theory is to identify a strategy based 
on the analysis of a set of situations to determine the optimal approach. Ultimately, game 
theory in a specific circumstance comes down to the interacting players changing strategies 
to create countermeasures.240 The players can be either individual or a group, considering 
multiple decisions, and choosing to execute a particular plan.  
Game theory applications rest on several necessary assumptions: a) players are 
rational; b) all parties know the rules of the game; and c) players have an overview of the 
values in the game and are aware of the number of gains and losses. Through game theory, 
this thesis analyzes the question is the use of domestic measures intended to counter violent 
extremism a viable strategic option to decrease radicalization and disengage homegrown 
terrorists?  
1. Assumptions 
As an interagency task force, CVETF was designed to coordinate strategic efforts 
to thwart the threat of violent extremism. The primary approaches of CVE efforts 
contribute to mitigating the risk of homegrown terrorists are the assumptions for the 
development of this game theory. These assumptions develop the matrix of the outcomes 
of the partial conflict game between the U.S. government and the homegrown terrorists.  
According to DHS, the critical efforts toward CVE programming include:241  
Building capacity of government and civil society to design and carry out 
national CVE dialogues, strategies, and action plans; 
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Strengthening CVE efforts through local and municipal actors; 
Enhancing civil society’s role in CVE efforts, particularly among youth, 
women, and religious leaders; 
Counter-messaging and promoting alternative narratives; and 
Addressing radicalization in and through the criminal justice sector, such as 
through police-community engagement, diversion programs, and juvenile 
justice.242 
To mitigated radicalization and recruitment of Islamic extremism in the United States CVE 
efforts have strived towards prevention efforts. For domestic counterterrorism efforts, CVE 
strategies have been geared to community building prevention objectives.   
2. The Game 
It is essential to understand the set-up of the game so as to identify how the options 
relate to one another. Using letters A, B, C, and D to symbolize the possible options, Table 
2 illustrates how each option combines to produce a result wherein A represents United 
States Government (USG) increase CVE funding, B represents USG decrease CVE 
funding, C represents homegrown terrorists (HGT) increase recruiting efforts, and D 
represents HGT decrease recruiting efforts.  
For the homegrown terrorists, increase and/or decrease recruiting measures were 
determined—because ISIS recruiters are also American citizens. If increased measures 
within CVE are community-based in at-risk populations within the United States, these 
communities would have information that targets prevention and disengagements 
programs. This effect would cause the recruiter within those communities to decrease 
efforts, because of the possibility of being investigated or arrested by law enforcement.    
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Table 2. U.S. Government versus Homegrown Terrorists 
  Homegrown Terrorists  












2 AC 3 
USG increase CVE funding 
HGT increase recruiting efforts 
3 AD 1 
USG increase CVE funding 
HGT decrease recruiting efforts 
1 BC 4 
USG decrease CVE funding 
HGT increase recruiting efforts 
4 BD 2 
USG decrease CVE funding 
HGT decrease recruiting efforts 
 
There are four possible results:  
• AC = USG increases CVE funding; HGT increases recruiting efforts 
• AD = USG increases CVE funding; HGT decreases recruiting efforts 
• BC = USG decreases CVE funding; HGT increases recruiting efforts 
• BD = USG decreases CVE funding; HGT decreases recruiting efforts 
3. U.S. Government Options 
On a scale 4-to-1, with 4 as the best payoff and 1 as the worst payoff, this thesis 
assumes the rankings illustrated in Table 2 of USG CVE efforts to decrease homegrown 
terrorists recruiting efforts.  
Table 3. U.S. Government Playout Options  
4 BD = Best choice—USG decreases CVE funding; HGT decreases recruiting efforts  
3 AD = Next best—USG increases CVE funding; HGT decreases recruiting efforts  
2 AC = Least best—USG increases CVE funding; HGT increases recruiting efforts 
1 BC= Worst—USG decreases CVE funding; HGT increases recruiting efforts  
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4. Homegrown Jihadi Terrorists  
On a scale of 4-to-1, with 4 as the best option and 1 as the worst option, this thesis 
assumes the rankings illustrated in Table 3 for homegrown terrorists to increase recruiting 
efforts.  
Table 4. Homegrown Jihadi Terrorist Playout Options 
4 BC= Best choice—HGT increases recruiting efforts; USG decreases CVE funding 
3 AC= Next best—HGT increases recruiting efforts; USG increases CVE funding 
2 BD= Least best—HGT decreases recruiting efforts; USG decreases CVE funding 
1 AD= Worst—HGT decreases recruiting efforts; USG increases CVE funding 
 
Regulating the utility of any of these rankings is problematic. The cardinal utility 
method is applied to identify the measurable scale.  Used in this game, four is the best with 
one being the worse.243  
5. U.S. Government versus Homegrown Terrorists—Short-Term Tactical 
Model  
Based on the rankings and assumptions above, a game can be established to identify 
potential outcomes for each player. Table 4 shows the matrix of the game using letters and 
numbers to demonstrate how each option can combine with others to produce a result. The 
game’s matrix uses the arrows (USG blue and HGT red) to illustrate the direction each side 
would shift based on its opponent’s objectives.  
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Table 5. Short-Term Tactical Model Matrix 





























The matrix in Table 4 represents a short-term tactical concept in how to prioritize 
funding toward terrorism in the United States. The matrix shows the homegrown terrorists’ 
objective of continuous activity and U.S. government’s objective of counterterrorism. In 
the model, the U.S. government does not have a dominant strategy, whereas the 
homegrown terrorists do have a dominant strategy of C (increased recruiting efforts). 
Assuming that the government plays its maximum beneficial strategy, its choice would be 
B (decrease CVE funding). The Nash equilibrium determines the result of the expected 
payoffs 244 and suggests that if the government continues to decrease funding and resources 
to counterterrorism efforts, homegrown terrorists would be able to increase their 
recruitment efforts. Overall, the homegrown terrorists’ scope of operations would develop 
dramatically.  The Nash equilibrium in this matrix who not be the best choice for the U.S. 
government.   
Game theory’s value in this application helps provide insights about advantages or 
disadvantages in the nation’s allocation of more funding and resources for CVE. For 
example, Eckland writes in his thesis, “Personnel Recovery,”  
If a unique equilibrium does exist, one can then evaluate the point to 
determine if it is Pareto optimal. If no Nash equilibrium exists, neither 
player would want to play a single strategy with certainty, for the other 
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player could take advantage of such a choice. After assigning cardinal 
values, one can then recalculate both players’ security levels and determine 
the SQ [status quo] point to ascertain the game’s prudential or mixed-
strategy equilibrium solution.245  
The concept of this game neither indicates the absolute value of future events nor 
predicts them. However, it does offer projections of outcomes that could affect decision 
making. To determine if these maximin strategies are a stable outcome, the researcher must 
establish security levels, status quo, and dominant strategies. Overall, each player seeks to 
optimize his move based on his security level.  
D. POTENTIAL PLANNING APPROACHES  
Prudential security strategy is the two isolated constant-sum games for each player 
by both row and column. The plan the opposing player considers will either equalize or 
give a loss to himself to beat his opponent. The row player will maximize as the column 
player minimizes.246 This is the opposite for the column player when he maximizes; this is 
also known as a player’s security level. To determine the player’s security value is to 
maximize the outcome while the other player is attempting to minimize his opponent’s 
result.  
The Pareto optimal is defined by plotting the points that set the game’s feasible 
region. This area becomes the solution of the game, and players should consider nothing 
outside this area in their calculations. This area ensures the players have a guarantee that 
they can do neither worse nor better.247 Applying the prudential strategies also enables 
planners to consider other approaches. As Ecklund remarks,  
In the unlikely case that the players could reach an agreement in advance, 
especially if they had little confidence in the trustworthiness of their 
opponents, they would have every justification to try to protect themselves 
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from opponents reneging on the agreement by reneging on the agreement 
themselves.248  
As in the example, this chapter uses, if the U.S. government follows the maximin 
strategy B (decrease funding), the matrix confirms that the government would have an 
outcome of 1 (worst) and that homegrown terrorists would have an outcome of 4 (best). 
The result clearly favors the homegrown terrorists.  
This outcome confirms that increase funding is necessary for domestic 
counterterrorism efforts to ensure that the immediate threat to the United States with 
homegrown terrorist is prevented and disrupted. The funding is required to avert 
homegrown terrorist recruiting efforts and potential decrease radicalization.  
1. Continuous Operations War of Attrition Model 
The matrix model in Table 6 represents a war of attrition model. The homegrown 
terrorists continuously cause economic expenses; however, the U.S. government fights 
terrorism at minimum cost by only reacting when necessary.  
Table 6. War of Attrition Matrix 




























The military strategy of attrition warfare is to break down the enemy by eliminating 
its resources. For example, the United States used this approach in the Vietnam War, under 
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President Johnson’s directive to General William Westmoreland, the Commander of the 
U.S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam. General Westmoreland’s attrition strategy 
inflicted heavy losses on North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces through greater 
firepower. However, the cost of prevention was detrimental to the United States budget. 
Years later, the U.S. government has spent billions in the last two decades on 
counterterrorism. For example, the FBI budget for counterterrorism and intelligence is $1.9 
billion, and DOJ to target and disrupt homegrown threats had a $14 million budget in 
2017.249 The U.S. national debt is a primary concern for President Trump, the U.S. 
government, and American citizens. However, funding for the prevention of homegrown 
terrorists is necessary to protect America from individuals using pressure cookers as 
explosive devices and vehicles as weapons to mow down innocent citizens walking down 
the streets as well as the preventing the radicalization of individuals who want to leave the 
United States and travel abroad to a conflict occupied foreign land to wage jihad in support 
of ISIS.  
2. New Technology and Technique—Using a Three-Strategy Game 
Social and political games typically involve more than two players. The addition of 
the status quo, an n-person game, wherein n is assumed to be the third player; this illustrates 
results with another player. This strategy is positioned in a three-dimensional array using 
the Nash equilibrium. In a game with n ≥ 2 players, simultaneously and independently, the 
players choose between either option, X, and Y.250 Table 7 shows a proposed third-strategy 
solution named “new technology and technique.”  
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7,1 8,2 9,3 
Status Quo 
4,6 5,5 6,4 
Decrease Funding 
1,9 2,8 3,7 
Table 7 assumes that the U.S. government increases CVE with a concentration on 
a strategy invoking sophisticated technologies. The Nash equilibrium is 9,3 with a U.S. 
government-dominant strategy increase, while the homegrown terrorists have no dominant 
strategy.  
E. CONCLUSION 
As the results of this game theory exercise demonstrate, if the U.S. government 
decreases CVE funding, it will damage the country’s national security. The question the 
game asked is countering violent extremism domestically a viable strategic option to 
deradicalize and disengage homegrown terrorists? The answer is, yes, absolutely. 
Domestic CVE efforts focused on deradicalization and disengagement have the best chance 
of effectiveness. In testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Oversight and 
Government Reform on July 27, 2017, Seamus Hughes, Deputy Director of the Program 
on Extremism at the George Washington University, explained, 
The current administration’s proposed budget significantly curtails CVE 
funding. Moreover, the proposed budget cuts reduce the number of 
employees at DHS and other agencies that can serve on the CVE taskforce, 
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limiting the possibility that interagency cooperation will result in innovative 
program design and management in the future.251  
CVE in the United States needs funding and improvement. Moreover, CVE focus 
needs to be on applying lessons learned to develop a program to reduce the CVE threat. 
Since 2013, the NCTC, the DOJ, and the FBI have focused on engaging communities. 
However, due to lack of community trust in the agency, the FBI has a poor reputation for 
its efforts. In 2016, the FBI launched “Don’t Be a Puppet: Pull Back the Curtain on Violent 
Extremism,” a website informing young adults about propaganda messaging and 
encouraging resistance to recruitment. Unfortunately, the program suffered so much 
criticism from community groups and civil rights leaders, who expressed concern that such 
a program would increase ideological policing and surveillance efforts.252 In Rosand’s 
article “Fixing CVE in the United States Requires More Than Just a Name Change,” he 
makes the point that the prison system has become an incubator for violent extremism. He 
describes,  
The Bureau of Prisons can be faulted for not doing enough. Despite the 
growing number of people sent to federal prison for non-violent terrorism 
charges (over 300 since 9/11, with more than 90 individuals charged with 
mostly non-violent ISIS-related offenses, and 40 or so to be released in the 
next two to four years), the United States, unlike many countries in Europe 
(and increasingly beyond), has yet to put in place tailored plans for their 
rehabilitation inside jail or reintegration once they are released.253  
Overall, CVE is stumbling because of lack of resources and coordination efforts 
through the involved agencies. The efforts indicated in DHS goals need to have measures 
of effectiveness with reachable attainable measures of performance. None of these 
obstacles are insurmountable, and the prevention of jihadi radicalizing is too vital of a 
threat,  that it can not be ignored. For the U.S. government to continue to prevent the threat 
of homegrown terrorists, DHS needs to have its representatives fully trained and funded to 
protect the homeland from this insider threat so as to mitigate any vulnerabilities for 
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potential attacks. Increased funding for CVE efforts and community-based programs are 
measures that the government needs to take to avoid increased recruitment and 
radicalization, which pose significant threats to Americans and the nation.  
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V. SUMMARY OF POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
AND CONCLUSION 
It is often assumed that social movements and insurgencies emerge when 
individuals become angry enough about some social condition that they 
organize in order to bring about change. While there is certainly an element 
of truth in this assumption, in most societies there are plenty of individuals 
dissatisfied with the status quo, but few become activists or form a social 
movement. Instead, other factors need to fall into place before a social 
movement can emerge.  
—Sean Everton254 
Understanding the increasing threat of homegrown ISIS-inspired citizens and 
incorporating additional policy solutions are necessary for the United States to continue to 
remain safe. Support for ISIS is distributed in sharp clusters across the United States, and 
these communities are at a higher risk, where initiatives are needed nationwide to raise 
community awareness to keep individuals from succumbing to recruitment. Budget 
constraints and limited resources has the potential to limit success to decrease this threat 
and to spread awareness that prevents future violence.  
A. PROPOSITIONS 
The significance of past conflicts, Muslim injustices, social media, and a call of 
duty all have relevance in the mobilization and recruitment of the radicalization of 
homegrown terrorists. Past conflicts within the Muslim world have affected individuals, 
and jihadist recruiters use this to their advantage to recruit as the Minnesota cluster proves. 
The Internet has ultimately transformed the visibility of jihad sympathizers making them 
and their message more prominent and accessible than ever before. Some Muslims believe 
they must fight for Islam and that Islam needs to be protected against nonbelievers. 
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1. Past Conflicts and Muslim Injustices   
In 1993 during Somalia’s civil war, the United States helped the Somalian 
government with security and humanitarian efforts through Operation Restore Hope.255 
During that time, Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda had insignificant influences as far as 
inspiring terrorist attacks as they were trailing tribes in the area to fight the United Nations 
and U.S. forces. Al-Shabaab is a known terrorist organization in Somalia, and it attracted 
an extraordinary number of American jihadists in 2007. Then, as now, many were from 
Minneapolis, Minnesota, and of Somali descent.  
At the time of the Somali civil war, al-Shabab recruiters successfully leveraged the 
involvement of Ethiopian troops working in conjunction with the Somali government to 
create a narrative of “crusader” aggression. Jihadists began to seduce young men to the 
battlefield and indoctrinate them with radical Islamic ideas and jihad. By the fall of 2010, 
U.S. intelligence estimated that several American citizens had risen to senior leadership 
positions in the organization.256 
During investigations and court proceedings, individuals in the Minnesota cluster 
stated that part of their inspiration to support ISIS was came from their belief that “Islam 
is at war” in reaction to the many injustices Muslims have faced globally. Due to their peer-
to-peer relationships and the jihadist ideologies they researched online, members of the 
Minnesota cluster also felt it was their religious obligation to support the call to jihadi. The 
online propaganda ISIS, which is continuously released, instilled the message that it had a 
perfect Islamic society fulfilled as paradise. The recruiter would then have this perceived 
power, which would allow them to fight and protect fellow Muslims.  
One influencer of individuals in the Minnesota cluster was Anwar Nassar Awlaki, 
an American-born Muslim of Yemeni descent who spoke flawless English and Arabic. He 
was both intelligent and educated. He studied abroad in Yemen as well as in the United 
States and was an admired imam preaching in many U.S. mosques. Through the years, his 
preaching became evermore radical and eventually became an extreme Islamist. To his 
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followers, Awlaki repeatedly preached that Muslims were under attack around the world 
and that jihad was both justified and necessary if the injustices inflicted on Muslims were 
to stop. Although he was killed in 2011, Awlaki was also an emerging player in the 
radicalization of Westerners, especially for many Somali Americans in Minnesota before 
and after 2014. Many of the codefendants and attempted travelers in this network testified 
in numerous court records, documents, and public hearings that they watched hours of 
Alwaki’s lectures. Alwaki’s strategies of recruiting and mobilizing followers online 
continued years after his death. The magazine he founded, Inspire, continues to motivate 
American Muslims to plan and plot against America in defense of the Muslim community. 
2. Social Media Support Jihadist Mobilization and Recruitment 
ISIS propaganda through social media has contributed to ISIS supporters in the 
United States becoming jihadists. As Sageman notes,  
The Internet creates a seemingly concrete bond between the individual and 
a virtual Muslim community. This virtual community plays the same role 
that ‘imagined communities’ playing in the development of the feelings of 
nationalism, which made people love and die for their nations as well as 
hate and kill for them. Because of this virtual nature, the Internet community 
has no earthly counterpart and becomes idealized in the mind of surfers. 
This community is just, egalitarian, full of opportunity, unified in an Islam 
purged of national peculiarities and devoid of corruption, exploitation, and 
persecution.257  
The Internet provides access to anyone with access through platforms of information 
through videos, images, audio recordings, chat rooms, blogs, and discussion boards, as well 
as live streams of people with information. Communication among Islamic chat rooms 
on social media site has become egalitarian, and users recognize no authority other than 
the tests of the Quran and Hadith. These tests use various theological arguments of Islam 
practices that specifically appeal to most Muslims, regardless of their theological 
educational background, to lure potential recruits.258 Virtually all information is “at one’s 
fingertips,” and one can absorb every bit of information as one chooses.  
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The online career of al-Shabaab member Mohamed Abdullahi Hassan (also known 
as Mujahid Miski)259 is another example of how the Internet serves as a conduit for jihadist 
organizations. Hassan campaigned with an intensive online network from Minnesota aimed 
at communicating with group members as potential recruits. Miski was American born in 
Minnesota and of Somalian descent. In 2013, he left the United States and fled to Somalia 
to support al-Shabaab; currently, his status and location is unknown. However, he is 
connected to individuals in the Minnesota cluster because of kinship and friendship ties.  
This Minnesota cluster of Somali Americans shifted its support from al-Shabaab in 
Somalia to ISIS in Syria because ISIS began to target al-Shabaab’s recruiting network and 
persuaded them to travel to Syria. By using the individuals that fled to Somali as recruiters 
to contact their friends and family in the United States, mainly Minnesota, to inspire them 
to flee to Syria. ISIS recruitment efforts in both Somali and in Minnesota has capitalized 
on the caliphate, the apocalypse and the support of the global Muslim community. Al-
Shabab remains an affiliate of al-Qaeda, yet ISIS has repeatedly attempted to gain their 
loyalty. The State Department has declared, “ISIS-Somalia was formed in October 2015 
after Abdiqadr Mumin—then a senior leader of al-Shabaab—and about twenty of his 
followers, pledged allegiance to ISIS.”260 These individuals contacted others still in the 
United States via instant messages or on Facebook and apparently invited them to bask in 
the glory of jihad and enticed them to flee. During its height in 2015, ISIS produced over 
200 products weekly261 of jihad-inspired propaganda used to influence and target recruits. 
Most of the 24 individuals within the Minnesota cluster confirmed their support of ISIS 
was motivated and inspired by this propaganda. This online network is an example of the 
quagmire the world faces in modern times with Islamic radicals.  
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3. Call of Duty to the Umma  
In 2014, ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the caliphate and himself as 
the world Muslim leader. He required all Muslims to support him, ISIS, and to declare 
jihad on all who were against them. Al-Baghdadi instructed his listeners to flee to Syria or 
to execute attacks anywhere they could in support of ISIS. In his publicized message, he 
stated, “There is no excuse for any Muslim not to migrate to the Islamic State. Joining is a 
duty of every Muslim. We are calling on you to either join or carry weapons [to fight] 
wherever you are.”262  
Jihad is based on a distorted interpretation of Islam that justifies the war to 
protect the global Muslim community, the umma.263 Minnesota has a diasporic community 
of Muslims, and it is sometimes referred to as “Little Mogadishu,” the Somali capital of 
America Muslims. Berger explains Islamic literature notably from the Muslim World 
League states, “Islam is under attack from enemies everywhere. Islam is misunderstood 
because of vicious lies by its enemies. Muslims are persecuted and discriminated against 
on the global stage and in individual countries.”264 For example, Abu Musab al Suri, 
a jihadist theorist, claims the Internet has greatly expanded potential audiences and 
that the purpose of jihad is to call Muslims to protect the umma, the worldwide Muslim 
community.265 
Both community and religious identity are essentials to Muslims. In the United 
States, Muslim-Americans embrace both aspects of their identity. The majority are proud 
to be American (92 percent) and Muslim (97 percent).266 Indeed, nearly nine in 10 
(89 percent) attest to be honored to be both Muslim and American.267 However, regarding 
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their ability to integrate into American culture, some declare they are satisfied, while many 
believe that although they have much in common with most American citizens, in most 
ways, they stand out in the United States.268 For instance, there is a distinctive appearance 
as most Muslim women wear a hijab. Additionally, 80 percent state their bond to the global 
Muslim community is strong.269 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS  
This thesis recommends the FBI consider strategies to expand its Counterterrorism 
Division and launch an information operations campaign for awareness and prevention of 
Islamic extremism. Congress, law enforcement, and private industry most enhance 
cooperation to discuss solutions to resolve the progressing threat and to ensure public 
safety against terrorists’ threats with a plan that protects civil liberties and cybersecurity. 
The joint terrorism task forces (JTTFs) is the Counterterrorism Division of the FBI are 
multi-agency units, composed of investigators, linguists, intelligence analysts, and tactical 
personnel who investigate terrorist activity. There are currently 103 JTTFs and 4,400 
agents located in cities across the country. Additional funds are necessary to expand the 
FBI’s Counterterrorism Division to monitor communications of suspected terrorist 
supporters and provide additional resources to be shared among partnered agencies for 
intelligence professionals and law enforcement personnel to disrupt terrorist activity within 
the United States.270 
It also recommends that the United States develop more effective and proactive 
solutions to counter the ISIS’s messaging and block social and Internet access aimed at 
recruitment. How can the United States government protect itself, its people, and its 
community when this spread of theology has incubated in social media sites, such as 
Facebook, Twitter and YouTube like an infectious disease? Additional research is 
necessary to assess the extent of this phenomenon. Homegrown terrorists supporting an 
extreme Islamic ideology have become a viral outbreak confined to specific cities and 
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states across the United States. The United States government must ensure that this threat 
is defeated before it evolves into an epidemic rapidly spreading across the country. 
Alternatively, the threat has advanced into becoming a global pandemic and poses a 
dangerous risk to national security and foreign policy. The U.S. government agencies and 
the Intelligence Community must communicate effectively with social media networks, 
such as Twitter, YouTube, Facebook, and others, to strategize a practical solution to 
eradicate the threat of online ISIS radicalization and recruitment. Seamus Hughes suggests,  
To grapple with this tension, the United States should work with companies 
to develop trusted flagging mechanisms, algorithms, and perhaps “robust 
hashing” techniques developed by such computer scientists as Dartmouth 
College professor Hany Farid that can identify which accounts present 
national security threats.271  
The United States needs to respond to this threat as it would to an emergency. 
A third recommendation is that we increase popular awareness and community 
support throughout the United States to combat the threat radicalization and recruitment 
poses by as many methods as possible, including the launch of a full-blown information 
operations campaign focused on promoting and disseminating knowledge, information, 
and guidance to the masses. The campaign should use the Internet, social media sites, 
commercials, public events, newsletters, magazines, manuals, and other printed materials 
as public awareness platforms regarding the homegrown terrorists’ threat imposed by ISIS. 
A challenge, of course, will be to do this without ramping up anti-Muslim rhetoric, which 
as we have already seen, appears to increase support for ISIS. 
To summarize, this thesis recommends that 
• The federal government needs to create deradicalization intervention 
strategies to prevent citizens fleeing abroad to fight with a terrorist 
organization and for a citizen to plot attacks in the United States.  
• The U.S. government needs to collaborate with social media companies to 
facilitate the removal of Islamic extremism content. The development of 
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althorim software to detect violent content should be further researched and 
developed.  
• All government and law enforcement agencies should incorporate violent 
Islamist extremism training with emphasis on triggers of radicalization. 
Agencies need additional training on deradicalization and disengagement.  
• The government, DHS, and other agencies should design national outreach 
campaign to foster general awareness and build communities to prevent 
radicalization, to enhance the understanding of extremism, and to build 
awareness on how to respond and prevent radicalization on the community 
level; 
C. CONCLUSION  
Unfortunately, despite all our progress against ISIL on the battlefield and in 
the financial realm, our efforts have not reduced the group’s terrorism 
capability and global reach. 
—John Brennan, CIA Director 272 
Understanding what drives homegrown Islamic extremism is only the first step in 
combatting it; however, it is an essential first step. The rate of U.S. homegrown Islamic 
extremists has increased from 2014 to 2017 with this wave of ISIS. Terrorism will likely 
always continue, whether ISIS or another group, and this makes efforts to promote national 
resilience vital. Without a doubt, countering this radical ideology will be a long-term 
challenge. While this study’s findings provide an understanding of the homegrown jihad 
terrorists in the United States, much additional research is needed to diagnose this issue. 
Other research could provide a further explanation of these occurrences and could 
potentially be used to deter future recruitment efforts. Intervention programs could 
significantly contribute to ongoing prevention efforts.273 
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In his thesis, Pierson notes a statement, credited to Yemeni journalist Abdulelah 
Haider Shaye, encapsulating the core of Islamist ideas: “that ISIS was drafted by Sayyid 
Qutb, taught by Abdullah Azzam, globalized by Osama bin Laden, transferred to reality by 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and implemented by al-Baghdadi, Abu Omar, and Abu Bakr.”274 
ISIS’s rise and global growth, with the purest followers of Islam by demonstrating their 
unmatch devotion to Allah and their strict implementation of sharia law, has shown the 
world their ruthless expression of Islam.275 ISIS’s strategy is to instill in its followers the 
desire to die for the caliphate and usher in a world without infidels—without those who do 
not ardently support them.  
The implications for policymakers is to consider multifaceted strategies for 
defeating an extreme ideology. For nearly 17 years, the United States has discussed and 
debated this large problem set. If radicalization within Muslim countries and of American-
Muslims and ISIS ideology and narratives continues, new strategies are imperative to 
mitigate this threat. As reflected by several George Washington University studies on ISIS 
from 2015 to 2018, the risk of violent extremism has expanded significantly in the United 
States. Since May of 2018, 161 U.S. citizens have committed crimes in support of ISIS.276 
However, this data cannot show the level of integration of each supporter nor how these 
supporters were or were not integrated either within the Muslim community or within a 
society that believes in extreme versions of Islam. If policymakers can understand the 
reasons why American citizens who are Muslim or non-Muslim are supporting these 
groups, then they can formulate and consider solutions.277 In the past 16 years, jihadism 
has advanced terrorism through unpredictable methods and techniques. ISIS Salafi 
ideological interpretation that the Islamic tradition is legitimately served by strict Islamic 
order that provides a simple life with a structured system of what is right and wrong, 
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permissible and forbidden, has attracted militants globally.278 The United States has spent 
trillions of dollars to counter terrorism through diplomacy, homeland security, and military 
campaigns, and with this capabilities and initiatives, the threat stands.279  
ISIS is unquestionably a threat. Despite the loss of most of ISIS’s physical territory, 
its digital footprint still survives. Its messaging is still active and its seduction to lure U.S. 
citizens to mobilize, and revolt is present in the living rooms of Americans who are 
sympathizers and support it. However, it is incumbent on us to realize that even if ISIS 
were to become obsolete tomorrow, there remain hundreds of other extremist groups in 
line to wage jihad with the same intent and willing to use all forces necessary to establish 
a transnational caliphate.  
This thesis has reviewed the threat of radicalization and terrorism as a pressing 
issue that faces our world today and the dangers of homegrown terrorists. This thesis has 
explained several examples of the vulnerability to national security that violent extremist 
groups pose and the harm they inflict on society primarily through the Internet. Today’s 
extremists are dialed into social media, which enables a virtual battlefield of recruitment 
and radicalization.  
The data gathered illuminates the complexity of the threat that homegrown 
terrorists pose. Additionally, the analysis in this thesis established that Islamist extremists 
and the theology that drives them are no longer only found abroad. The 2018 Program of 
Extremism tracker confirms the threat has expanded significantly into the United States 
through its finding that 161 U.S. citizens since 2015 have committed crimes in support of 
ISIS.280 This research postulated that focus on counter-radicalization efforts both online 
and through increased cooperation between local communities and federal authorities 
could decrease the potential for recruitment.  
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The thesis concludes that if the U.S. government decreases CVE funding, it will 
damage the national security of the United States. Domestic CVE efforts focused on 
deradicalization and disengagement have the best chance of effectiveness. This thesis also 
includes an examination of the radicalization trajectories and consideration to design policy 
solutions to protect the United States in the future to counter violent extremists.  
In the research of Seamus Hughes at the George Washington’s Program on 
Extremism on the surge of Americans who have supported ISIS and jihadism has 
revealed there is no clear profile encompassing a potential radicalization candidate. 
Research has determined that there is not a set of predictable patterns of radicalization of 
an individual. Each radicalized individual was unique in age, financial status, education 
level, knowledge of Islam, and practice in faith.281 However, one of the prominent findings 
of Hughes is that family members can detect early suspicions. Hughes labels it “simply 
parents intuition.”282 His research recognized how parents, extended family members, and 
even communities leaders would intervene and do all they could to prevent their loved one 
from supporting ISIS. However, currently, the United States does not have deradicalization 
or disengagement programs through which family members or community leaders can 
get assistance.  
Overall, in exploring why Americans have supported ISIS, this thesis has discussed 
how the caliphate can be viewed as something historic and part of the call of duty to the 
Muslim people. American jihadis are lured to embrace this terrorist groups propaganda 
because of the successful recruiting skills ISIS has embodied. The research concluded 
indicates that supporters are looking for an adventure or military training and others for life 
purpose.  
Initially, I intended to collect data to construct an SNA report that included known 
ties representing a network of U.S. citizens who have either been arrested or are confirmed 
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foreign fighters. However, the level of research required to build an entire network of 
homegrown terrorists in the United States was beyond the scope of this project. Overall, 
this project was scaled back to identify a cluster of U.S. citizens who have been arrested 
and convicted for being ISIS supporters and how SNA could assist law enforcement 
agencies and the military by using potential targeting and course of action strategies. The 
Minnesota jihadi cluster stands out as a location with a disproportionately high percentage 
of extremism and radicalization. Future research should examine this high degree of 
radicalization in this area of the United States and construct a more comprehensive SNA 
report that would include all those arrested for ISIS-related crimes and those who have 
become foreign fighters.  
Furthermore, additional research could focus on practical recruitment strategies of 
violent extremist groups to determine what efforts we should make toward a counter-
messaging campaign. If counterterrorism agencies utilize high-quality design and 
production messages to target populations with the potential to radicalize, they can 
prevent individuals from becoming violent. Additionally, I recommend the design of a 
counter media campaign to saturate the community with awareness. Further research could 
identify and coalesce the lessons learned within the past decades and discover what 
countermeasures are necessary to produce a comprehensive strategy. Lastly, even though 
the physical battlespace of ISIS in Syria and Iraq is dismantled and the majority of its media 
campaign has dissolved, we still need to discover how this will change the call to duty in 




APPENDIX.  MINNESOTA ISIS CLUSTER 
I researched the names and information identified in this Appendix and the 
Minnesota cluster through various open source data. The majority of the data has come 
from the following reports: the New America International Security program Terrorism in 
America After 9/11, the George Washington University Program on Extremism 
publications ISIS in America, Fear Thy Neighbor: Radicalization and Jihadist Attacks in 
the West, and The Travelers: American Jihadists in Syria and Iraq as well as the George 
Washington Program Extremism Tracker and Counter Extremism Project’s Guide to 
Online Propagandists.283  
Table 8. Six Codefendants of Minnesota Cluster284 
285 
Abdirahman Yasin Daud (U.S. Citizen, Somali origin)286 
Attended South High School 
Graduated from Heritage Academy in Minneapolis. 
Attended Minneapolis Community and Technical College 
Member of the Al-Farooq mosque in Bloomington 
+Friendships: Abdullahi Yusuf, Abdi Nur, Abdirizak Warsame 
287 
Adnan Farah (U.S. Citizen, Somali origin)288 
Attended South High School 
Member of the Al-Farooq mosque in Bloomington 
Brother: Mohamed Farah 
+Friendships: Abdullahi Yusuf, Abdi Nur, Abdirizak Warsame 
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Guled Omar (U.S. Citizen, Somali origin)290 
Attended high school in Minneapolis 
Member of the Al-Farooq mosque in Bloomington 
+Friendships w/ Yusuf Jama, Hamza Ahmed, Abdullahi Yusuf, Abdi 
Nur, Abdirizak Warsame 
291 
Hanad Mustafe Musse (U.S. Citizen, Somali origin)292 
Student at Minneapolis Community and Technical College 
Member of the Al-Farooq mosque in Bloomington 
+Friendships: Abdullahi Yusuf, Abdi Nur, Abdirizak Warsame 
293 
Mohamed Abdihamid Farah (U.S. Citizen, Somali origin)294 
Graduated 2012 from Heritage Academy of Science and Technology 
Member of the Al-Farooq mosque in Bloomington 
Brother: Adnan Farah 
+Friendships: Abdullahi Yusuf, Abdi Nur, Abdirizak Warsame 
295 
Zacharia Yusuf Abdurahman (U.S. Citizen, Somali origin)296 
2013 graduate of Heritage Academy of Science and Technology, 
Attended Minneapolis Community and Technical College 
Member of the Al-Farooq mosque in Bloomington 
+Friendships: Abdullahi Yusuf, Abdi Nur, Abdirizak Warsame 
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Table 9. Attempt Travelers 
297 
Abdirizak Warsame (U.S. Citizen, Somali origin)298  
Attended Heritage Academy of Science and Technology 
Attended Normandale Community College 
Member of Al-Farooq mosque in Bloomington 
Friendships: Zacharia Abdurahman, Guled Ali Omar, Abdirahman Yasin 
Daud, Mohamed Abdihamid Farah, Hanad Mustafe Musse, Adnan Farah, 
Hanad Mohallim, Hamza Ahmed, Abdi Nur, Yusuf Jama 
299 
Abdullahi Yusuf (U.S. Citizen, Somali origin)300 
Attended Burnsville High School 
Graduate from Heritage High School 
Member of Al-Farooq mosque in Bloomington 
Sentenced: 
Friendships: Zacharia Abdurahman, Guled Ali Omar, Abdirahman Yasin 
Daud, Mohamed Abdihamid Farah, Hanad Mustafe Musse, Adnan Farah, 
Hanad Mohallim, Hamza Ahmed, Abdi Nur, 
301 
Ahmend Omar302 
Friendships: Abdirahman Daud, Adnan Farah, Amir Meshal, Hanad Musse, 
Mohammed Farah, Zacharia Abdurahman, Mohammed Roble, Guled Omar, 
Mohammad Omar 
303 
Hamza Ahmed (U.S. Citizen, Somali origin)304 
Attended Burnsville High School 
Friendships: Zacharia Abdurahman, Guled Ali Omar, Abdirahman Yasin 
Daud, Mohamed Abdihamid Farah, Hanad Mustafe Musse, Adnan Farah, 
Hanad Mohallim, Abdi Nur, Abdullahi Yusuf. 
 
  
                                                 
297 Counter Extremism Project, Guide to Online Propagandists.  
298 Counter Extremism Project, Guide to Online Propagandists; Vidino and Hughes, ISIS in America. 
299 Laura Yuen, “Amid ISIS Terror Concerns, a Minnesota Man Is Scrutinized but Not Charged,” MPR 
News, September 21, 2015, https://www.mprnews.org/story/2015/09/19/amir-meshal.  
300 Yuen, “Third ISIS Sentence of the Day.”   
301 Meleagrou-Hitchens, Hughes, and Clifford, The Travelers. 
302 Counter Extremism Project, Guide to Online Propagandists. 
303 Laura Yuen, “Called to Fight: Minnesota’s ISIS Recruits,” MPR News, March 9, 2016, 
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2015/03/25/minnesota-isis.  
304 Yuen, “Called to Fight: Minnesota’s ISIS Recruits.”  
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Table 10. Confirmed Travelers to Syria 
305 
Amir Meshal306 
Abdi Nur, Abdirahman Daud, Abullahi Yusof, Adnan Farah, Amir Meshal, 
Guled Omar, Hanad Musse, Mohammed Farah, Zacharia Abdurahman 
307 
Abdi Nur (U.S. Citizen, Somali origin)—At-large308 
Graduated Southwest High School 
Attended Normandale Community College 
Member of Al-Farooq mosque in Bloomington 
Friendships: Zacharia Abdurahman, Guled Ali Omar, Abdirahman Yasin 
Daud, Mohamed Abdihamid Farah, Hanad Mustafe Musse, Adnan Farah, 
Hanad Mohallim, Hamza Ahmed, Yusuf Jama, Abdirizak Warsame, Hesi 
Karie, Hamse Karie, Douglas McCain, Abdifatah Ahmed, 
309 
Abdifatah Ahmed (U.S. Citizen, Somali origin)—Dead310 
Friendships: Abdi Nur, Hanad Mohallim, Douglas McAuthur McCain, Hesi 
Karie, Hamse Karie 
311 
Douglas McAuthur McCain (U.S. Citizen, Unknown origin) Dead312 
Attended high schools in the Robbinsdale 
Friendships: Abdi Nur, Abdifatah Ahmed, Hanad Mohallim 
 
Hamse Karie313 
Friendships: Abdi Nur. Abdifatah Ahmed, Abdirizak Warsame, Douglas 
McAuthur, Guled Omar, Hesi Karie, Hanad Abdullahi Mohallim 
                                                 
305 Yuen, “Amid ISIS Terror Concerns.”  
306  Meleagrou-Hitchens, Hughes, and Clifford, the Travelers.  
307 George Washington University, “The Cases Program on Extremism.”    
308 Hughes and Vidino, “ISIS in America.”  
309 Meleagrou-Hitchens, Hughes, and Clifford, The Travelers.  
310 Meleagrou-Hitchens, Hughes, and Clifford.  
311 Counter Extremism Project, Guide to Online Propagandists.    
312 Counter Extremism Project.     
313 Meleagrou-Hitchens, Hughes, and Clifford, The Travelers.  
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314 
Hanad Abdullahi Mohallim (U.S. Citizen, Somali origin)—Dead315 
Burnsville High School 
Friendships: Abdi Nur, Abdifatah Ahmed, Douglas McCain, Zacharia 
Abdurahman, Guled Ali Omar, Abdirahman Yasin Daud, Mohamed 
Abdihamid Farah, Hanad Mustafe Musse, Adnan Farah, Abdirizak 
Warsame, Hersi Karie, Hamse Karie 
 
Hersi Karie316 
Friendships: Abdi Nur, Abdifatah Ahmed, Guled Omar, Hamse Karie, 
Hanad Abdullahi Mohallim 
 
Ifrah Nur317 
Friendships: Abdirahman Daud, Abullahi Yusof, Adnan Farah, Amir 
Meshal, 
Guled Omar, Hanad Musse, Mohammed Farah, Nur Sister BF, Zacharia 
Abdurahman, Mohammed Roble, Abdi Nur, Omar Jamal 
 
Mohammad Omar318 
Friendships: Abdi Nur, Abdirahman Daud, Adnan Farah, Amir Meshal, 
Hanad.Musse 
Mohammed Farah, Zacharia Abdurahman, Ahmend Omar, Guled Omar 
319 
Mohammed Roble320 
Friendships: Abdirahman Daud, Abullahi Yusof, Adnan Farah, Guled 
Omar, Nur Sister BF, Mohammed Farah, Abdi Nur, Ahmend Omar, Ifrah 
Nur 
321 
Yusra Ismail (U.S. Citizen—Unknown origin)—At-large322 
Attended Lighthouse Academy of Nations 
Al-Farooq mosque in Bloomington 
Friendships: Abdirizak Warsame, Guled Ali Omar, Abdi Nur 
                                                 
314 Meleagrou-Hitchens, Hughes, and Clifford.  
315 Meleagrou-Hitchens, Hughes, and Clifford.  
316 Meleagrou-Hitchens, Hughes, and Clifford.   
317 Meleagrou-Hitchens, Hughes, and Clifford.  
318 Meleagrou-Hitchens, Hughes, and Clifford.   
319 Erik Ortiz, “Minneapolis Bridge Collapse Survivor Mohamed Roble Charged with Joining ISIS,” 
NBC News, August 25, 2106, https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/minneapolis-bridge-collapse-
survivor-mohamed-roble-charged-joining-isis-n637636. 
320 Ortiz, “Minneapolis Bridge Collapse Survivor.”  
321 Meleagrou-Hitchens, Hughes, and Clifford, The Travelers.  
322 Meleagrou-Hitchens, Hughes, and Clifford.  
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323 
Yusuf Jama (U.S. Citizen—Unknown origin)—Believed dead324 
Friendships: Guled Omar, Abdirizak Warsame, Hamza Ahmed, 
 
 
Table 11. ISIS Supporters 
325 
Muhammed Abdullahi Hassan, or “Mujahid Miski”326 
Friendships: Abdi Nur, Abullahi Yusof, Amir Meshal 
 
Omar Jamal327 





                                                 
323 Counter Extremism Project, Guide to Online Propagandists.     
324 Counter Extremism Project.     
325 Vidino and Hughes, ISIS in America.  
326 Counter Extremism Project; Vidino and Hughes, ISIS in America.  
327 Counter Extremism Project, Guide to Online Propagandists.  
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